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Prologue: From Everson to Allen

The opening words of the Bill of Rights-"Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof"'t-have provided a constitutional framework for this country's unique blending of religious freedom, diversity, and harmony. Although separation of church and state,
embodied in the first amendment's establishment clause, is deeply
* Dean and Judge Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law, New York University School of
Law. Dean Redlich is also Co-Chair of the Commission on Law and Social Action of the
American Jewish Congress. The American Jewish Congress has been involved in many of
the cases discussed in this article, either through the participation of its staff counsel or
through the filing of amicus curiae briefs. The views expressed are those of the author.
I U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

rooted in American history, Supreme Court involvement in this
area is of comparatively recent origin, dating from the Everson v.
Board of Education2 case in 1947.
A brief review of the major Supreme Court decisions prior to
1969 is in order. Perhaps it is not surprising that all of them arose
in the school context: adherents of religious education either
sought financial help for children in religious schools, or sought to
use the public schools to further religious practices or the teaching
of religion.
Everson involved a New Jersey statute that permitted a local
board of education to reimburse parents for the costs of bus transportation to Catholic parochial schools. Both the majority and the
dissent in Everson drew heavily on the events in Virginia in 1784,
which had led to James Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, written in 1785 to protest a
proposed bill that would have required each taxpayer to pay an
amount to a church of the taxpayer's own choosing.3 There were
no public schools in Virginia at the time, and education was a principal function of the churches. Madison condemned the tax as an
"establishment," and its defeat in Virginia was followed by enactment of Jefferson's Bill for Religious Liberty.
In light of Justice Rehnquist's recent attacks on the historical
underpinnings of the Court's view of the establishment clause, 4 it is
useful to review the Everson opinion. Both Justice Black's majority
opinion, andJustice Rutledge's dissent, relied on the Virginia experience to argue that separation of church and state, and not merely
the avoidance of the state religion or the favoring of one religion
over another, was the guiding principle of interpretation of the establishment clause. In his oft-quoted dicta, Justice Black wrote:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
2 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
,3 The Remonstrance was included as an appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent. See
330 U.S. at 63 (1947).
4 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2508 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

1096

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1094

any religious organization or groups and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church and
State." 5
This theme was echoed in Justice Rutledge's dissent: "Not
simply an established church, but any law respecting an establishment of religion is forbidden. . . . Madison could not have confused 'church' and 'religion,' or 'an established church' and 'an
establishment of religion.' "6
Scholars and justices have disagreed over whether the first
amendment was intended to embody these principles developed in
Virginia a few years earlier, or whether the Madison and Jefferson
views of separation were intended to be applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, or whether they are applicable
to the different factual settings of public schools in the mid-twentieth century. 7 There is little doubt, however, that Madison and Jefferson emphasized the principles of separation of church and state
at least prior to 1789, and that the majority of the Supreme Court
has consistently adopted that interpretation of the establishment
clause, starting with Everson.
But agreement on general principles of interpretation did not
lead to agreement on the constitutionality of the practices in Everson
itself. Justice Black's majority opinion upheld the bus reimbursement program on grounds that it was "public welfare legislation"
designed not to benefit religion but to help children get to school
safely. 8
Rereading Everson following four decades of Court decisions is
like rediscovering seedlings that have grown into large trees. Virtually all of the arguments developed by the varying sides of the controversy were articulated in the Everson opinions. Justice Black
cautioned that "we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of
NewJersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do
5 330 U.S. at 15-16 (1947) (citation omitted).
6 Id. at 31.
7 See I. BRANDT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 343-55 (1948); L. LEvY, No

REESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING IN JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL HISTORY 169 (1972); Cahn, The Establishment of Religion Puzzle,

36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1274 (1961); Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: A
HistoricalPerspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1395 (1966). See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 238-42 (1963) (Brennan,J., concurring), in which he described as "futile and
misdirected" a "too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers" to help decide the
specific issue of the validity of the reading of the Bible or the Lord's Prayer at the start of
the school day. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2508
(1985), is the product of historical research, as were the opinions of Justices Black and
Rutledge in Everson. Justice Reed questioned the Everson historical analysis in his dissent in
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948).
8 330 U.S. at 16-17 (1947).
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not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general
state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious
belief

. .

. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap

religions than it is to favor them." 9 Thus, the concepts of benefitting the child, of accommodating to religion, of not depriving children in religious schools of secular benefits-all were developed in
Everson at the same time as the majority and the dissents articulated
a clear separation theory. The Court split over whether the expenditures were, as described in Black's dicta, a tax "levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion,"' 0 or whether they were something else, i.e., aid to a child, a
welfare benefit, or an accommodation to religion.
In 1948 and 1952, the battleground shifted to "released time,"
and it is not surprising that in the first of these cases, McCollum v.
Board of Education,"I the Court's emphasis on the concept of separation of church and state led to an 8-1 decision invalidating the
teaching of religion on school premises. But four years later, a bitterly divided Court in Zorach v. Clauson' 2 held that releasing children for religious school instruction on nonpublic school premises,
while other students remained in school, was a permissible accommodation to religion. Justice Douglas, who was with the majority in
Everson, wrote his oft-quoted and criticized comment:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being ....

When the state encourages religious in-

struction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting
the schedule or public events to sectarian needs, it follows the
best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature
of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the
Constitution a requirement that the
3 government show a callous
indifference to religious groups.'
Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion in McCollum, dissented in Zorach, arguing that he saw no difference between the two
cases.' 4 Justice Jackson criticized the majority for leaving the wall
between church and state "more warped and twisted than I
expected."15
In McCollum and Zorach there emerged a distinction that was to
find more detailed expression in the opinions of the Burger Court:
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 15-16.
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 315 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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teaching religion on public school premises is an impermissible endorsement of religion, but a program of cooperation that enables
the public and religious schools to perform their independent functions in their own ways might be permissible. Of course, the compulsory attendance requirement, which enforced a child's
attendance at the religious school, could be viewed as something
more than reasonable cooperation, and it was precisely on this
point that the majority and the dissent in Zorach differed most
sharply. "Entanglement" was not mentioned in these cases, but
16
concerns over entanglement were undoubtedly present.
In light of the principles that evolved in Everson, McCollum, and
Zorach, the 1962 decision in Engel v. Vitale,1 7 invalidating the New
York Regents' prayer, should have come as no surprise, although
the controversy it generated created the impression that new constitutional ground had been broken. Surely the Everson dicta, which
barred a state from passing laws that "aid one religion or prefer
one religion or another," precluded a state-prescribed prayer.
With only Justice Stewart dissenting, Justice Black's majority opinion concluded that neither the alleged neutrality of the "nondenominational" prayer, nor the "voluntary" participation by
students " . . can free it from the limitation of the Establishment
18
Clause."
One year later Engel was extended to a Pennsylvania law requiring Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the beginning of the school day. In the latter case, Abington School District
v. Schempp,1 9 Justice Clark's majority (8-1) opinion emphasized the
importance of neutrality in relations between government and religion, and set forth two parts of what was ultimately to become the
three-part test in establishment clause cases: "[T]o withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
20
religion."
The prayer and Bible reading cases also brought to the fore the
close connection between "neutrality" and "separation." Justice
Black's opinion appeared to accept the "non-denominational"
claim for the Regents' prayer and held it invalid because the gov16 See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 228 (1948) (Frankfurter,
concurring).
17 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
18

J.,

Id. at 430.

19 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
20 Id. at 222. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, suggested an establishment
clause test that would forbid "those involvements of religious with secular institutions
which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the
organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious
means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice." 374 U.S. at 295.
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ernment could not endorse any religious practice. Actually, as Edmond Cahn, a religious man and a perceptive legal philosopher,
brilliantly demonstrated, prayers can never be "neutral" among religions. 21 No single prayer can satisfy all religious beliefs, inevitably
creating controversy as to the nature of the prescribed prayer and a
sense of exclusion and coercion imposed on those whose beliefs or
non-beliefs differ from majority religious sentiments.
Despite the near-unanimity, Engel and Schempp contained hints
of future controversy. Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp,
raised the issue of the constitutionality of the moment of silence. 22
Justice Douglas' concurrence in Engel, and Justice Stewart's dissent,
speculated about the many other public manifestations of religion,
including legislative chaplains, andJustice Stewart's Schempp dissent
argued that the establishment clause was violated only if there was
evidence of government coercion. 23 Nor did the cases preclude
subsequent litigation over whether the challenged practices were
religious, as the Regents' prayer and Bible reading dearly were, or
whether they were educational, cultural, or otherwise secular, as
might be the case with the teaching of religion, or possibly the singing of Christmas carols. 24 Indeed, one year before Engel the Court
rejected an establishment clause challenge to Sunday closing laws,
concluding that whatever may have been the original religious motivation for such laws the "present purpose and effect of most of
them is to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens." 25
Thus, while these cases held that the establishment clause bars
government conduct where the purpose or effect is to advance religions, the forbidden motivation and effect would not always be as
easy as in Engel and Schempp. It was hard to argue that a prayer, or
Bible reading, had neither the purpose nor effect of advancing
religion.
As the Warren Court era came to an end, disagreements within
the Court related primarily to the application of its establishment
clause doctrine to particular cases, rather than to the doctrine itself.
Disagreement outside the Court, however, stemmed from those
with a strong belief that the Court's basic approach displayed a hostility toward religion. These sentiments were to grow more intense
with the rise of the so-called Religious Right during the years of the
21

Cahn, On Government and Prayer, in CONFRONTING INJUSTICE 189-201 (L. Cahn ed.

1966).
22 374 U.S. at 281 (1963).
23 Id. at 308. Justice Stewart later abandoned this limited view of the establishment
clause. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
24 See Note, Religious Holiday Observances in the Public Schools, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1116
(1973). See also Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980).
25 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
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Burger Court. The focus of this criticism, as it had since Engel, was
on the school prayer cases, which represented the core of the Warren Court's establishment clause interpretation.
The final major decision of the Warren Court interpreting the
establishment clause 26 was a prelude to an issue that assumed major importance to the Burger Court-financial aid to parochial
schools. In 1968, in Board of Education v. Allen, 27 the child-benefit
rationale stressed by Justice Black in Everson was extended to uphold a New York law requiring school officials to lend books without charge to students attending both public and private schools.
Justice White accepted the argument that the financial benefit accrued to the children, and their parents, rather than to the school.
The books were selected by the public school authorities, and ownership remained with the state. Justice Black, who had, in his Everson opinion, described the New Jersey law as approaching the
"verge" of the state's constitutional power, dissented in Allen, as
did Justices Douglas and Fortas. 28 The Allen case demonstrated
that, despite the near-unanimity that the Court had reached on
such issues as school prayer, the secular educational purpose behind many programs of financial aid to religious schools, and the
potential expansion of the child-benefit theory, created the possibility of massive government support for religious schools.
Whether the Burger Court could develop a constitutional approach
to meet this challenge to the separation of church and state was the
principal issue of establishment clause law when Earl Warren left
the Court.
II.

Enter "Entanglement": Walz (1970) and Lemon (1971)

The "released time" and school prayer cases had established
that religious schools could not expect government money for the
teaching of religion. Only by reading the establishment clause as
limited to the establishing of a state religion, or to preventing overt
discrimination among religions (a position later adopted only by
Justice Rehnquist), could government support for the teaching of
26 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) was also decided at this time. The Court
found that an Arkansas law that banned the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution
originated from "fundamentalist sectarian conviction." This finding compelled the conclusion that the law was an establishment of religion. In other contexts, however, efforts by
religious groups to influence educational policy could not be viewed as establishments.
The critical issue is whether the state is adopting religious beliefs, as distinct from moral
values. Epperson has been relied on by those challenging laws that require the teaching of
"scientific creationism." See McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982);
Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985).
27 392 U.S. 326 (1968).
28 392 U.S. at 250 (Black, J., dissenting); 392 U.S. at 254 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 392
U.S. at 269 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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religion be sustained. But why not government money to teach secular subjects? It could be argued that the purpose was secular (education), and the effect was to benefit the child, encourage parental
choice, or relieve public school overcrowding, rather than to promote religion (the next logical progression from bus transportation
in Everson and lending of textbooks in Allen). And if government
could "accommodate" religion by using the compulsory attendance
laws to make sure that the children attend religious classes after
school (Zorach), why not "accommodate" by paying for the costs of
purely secular subjects like history, mathematics and science? To
those who feared that massive government support for religious
schools would place the imprimatur of government behind religions (particularly those religions that believed in separate religious schools) and create bitter political divisiveness along religious
lines, the cases since Everson, while providing a barrier against direct support for the teaching of religion, were far from conclusive
on the issue of financial support for church-related schools. At a
time when many religious schools were clamoring for public funds,
and many parents, increasingly dissatisfied with the public school
system, were looking favorably on the alternative of religious
schools, what was needed was a constitutional doctrine to reinforce,
in the context of financial aid to religious schools, the principles
that had evolved in the prayer cases.
The idea that governmental actions should be judged in terms
of avoiding excessive entanglement between government and religion surfaced in the early 1970's as a third prong to the "purpose"
and "effect" test set forth in Schempp.
The first case to articulate the concept, Walz v. Tax Commission,29 was not a school-assistance case. Ironically, Walz upheld the
greatest single benefit available to churches-the real estate tax exemption uniformly provided by state and local governments. After
concluding that the purpose of the exemption was not to establish
religion but to spare "the exercise of religion from the burden of
property taxation levied on private profit institutions," Chief Justice Burger turned to the "effect" prong of the Schempp test:
We must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an
excessive government entanglement with religion. The test is
inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation of churches
or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of
church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
29 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The author, as New York City's First Assistant Corporation
Counsel, participated in the Walz case.
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procedures. 30
Thus, the Court, with only Justice Douglas dissenting, justified
an economic benefit to churches on grounds that the denial of the
benefit would have the effect of excessive government involvement
with religious institutions. One year later, in 1971, the "entanglement" idea emerged as the third prong of a test which helped close
the door on most forms of significant financial assistance to churchrelated elementary and high schools.
Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 1 and its companion cases, 3 2 were the first in
a series of cases in which the Burger Court, during the next decade,
grappled with state laws providing grants and support services to
religious schools. In all of them the Court applied the oft-quoted
test articulated in Lemon by Chief Justice Burger:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, Board of Education v. Allen, [citing] finally the statute
must not foster "an excessive
government entanglement with
33
religion" [citing Walz].
At issue in Lemon were Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes
that provided (in Rhode Island) for payments to supplement the
salaries of teachers of secular subjects in private elementary
schools, and (in Pennsylvania) the "purchase" of "secular educational services" from private schools. Both statutes required private schools to use books used in public schools and precluded
payment for subject matter that involved religious teaching.
The necessity of surveillance of the religious school teachers by
the state to insure compliance with the statutory restrictions, wrote
the Chief Justice, involved excessive and continuing entanglement
between government and religion. In reaching this conclusion the
Court ruled that it was not necessary to decide whether the restrictions on the teaching of religion were sufficient to enable the laws
to satisfy the "effect" prong. The majority noted the religious mission of the church-related elementary and secondary schools whose
teachers were subject to the direction and discipline of the religious
organizations. "Unlike a book," wrote the ChiefJustice, "a teacher
cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent
of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limi30 Id. at 674.
31 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32 Earley v. Di Censo and Robinson v. Di Censo, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
33 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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tations imposed by the First Amendment. 3' 4
Apart from the problemi of checking on teachers, the Rhode
Island law also required surveillance of the religious school's
records to determine how much money was being spent on secular
education, because the salary supplement was tied to a formula requiring a calculation of per-student expenditures for secular education in the private schools. And the Pennsylvania law had the
"further defect of providing state financial aid directly to the
church-related schools," 35 which necessitated greater surveillance
and control than payments to students and parents.
Thus, the Chief Justice recognized that direct aid to religious
schools to teach basic secular subjects involved two unacceptable
risks: Either the government funds would be used to support the
teaching of religion, or the government would become entangled
with the religious authorities in trying to make certain that this result did not occur. Neither alternative was compatible with what
the Court held to be the "dictates" of the religion clauses: "Under
our system the choice has been made that government is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches
excluded from the affairs of government." 3 6 Lemon was a recognition that the establishment clause protected all of the people from
government endorsement of religion, and also protected religion
from the control that inevitably accompanies extensive financial
support.
A particularly interesting portion of the Lemon opinion struck a
chord that had been sounded in Madison's Remonstrance in 1785,
the danger of political divisiveness. Describing this phenomenon as
a "broader base of entanglement," the Chief Justice wrote:
Partisans of parochial schools, understandably concerned with
rising costs and sincerely dedicated to both the religious and
secular education of their schools, will inevitably champion this
cause and promote political action to achieve their goals. Those
who oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, religious, or
fiscal reasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the
usual political campaign techniques to prevail. Candidates will
be forced to declare and voters to choose. It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many people confronted with issues of
this kind will find their votes aligned with their faith. ...
[P]olitical division along religious lines was one of the principal

evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect. .

.

. The history of many countries attests to the hazards

of religion's intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of
34 Id. at 619.
35 Id. at 621.
36 Id. at 625.
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religious belief.3 7
Finally, the Chief Justice seemed to be acutely aware of the
need to create a constitutional standard that could counter the tendency of religious organizations to use prior decisions, such as Everson and Allen, as a springboard for expanded financial aid to
religious schools. Perhaps in hope that the "entanglement" test
might provide a brake on the threatened flow of financial support
for such schools, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
We have already noted that modem governmental programs
have self-perpetuating and self-expanding propensities. These
internal pressures are only enhanced when the schemes involve
institutions whose legitimate needs are growing and whose interests have substantial political support. Nor can we fail to see
that in constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken
were thought to approach "the verge" [see Justice Black's opinion in Everson], have become the platform for yet further
steps ....
The dangers are increased by the difficulty of perceiving in advance exactly where the "verge" of the precipice
lies. As well as constituting an independent evil against which Religion
Clauses were intended to protect, involvement or entanglement
between
38
government and religion serves as a warning signal.
The ChiefJustice's opinion in Lemon was an incisive application
of constitutional principles, developed in earlier cases, to the different factual setting of direct financial support to church-related
schools. While Lemon has undergone many interpretations, and
been questioned as a firm test by its author, it has been reaffirmed
consistently in subsequent decisions, and its pragmatic insights deserve reemphasis in any review of the Burger Court's performance
in the church-state area.
Lemon may have effectively blocked direct government support
for elementary and secondary schools, but the Court has been far
more lenient with regard to aid to church-related colleges. Decided
with Lemon was Tilton v. Richardson,39 in which the Court, again with
ChiefJustice Burger writing the plurality opinion, sustained federal
construction grants to church-affiliated colleges for facilities devoted exclusively to secular educational purposes. 40 The majority
37 Id. at 622-23 (citations omitted).
38 Id. at 624-25 (emphasis added).

39 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
40 ChiefJustice Burger's opinion was joined by Justices Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun.
Justice White concurred in the judgment. The Court's judgment invalidated a portion of
the federal statute that imposed a 20-year limitation on the government's right to recover a
portion of the grant if the facility was no longer being used for secular purposes. Justices
Black, Douglas, and Marshall agreed with the latter conclusion, but would also have held
the enitre program invalid. Justice Brennan would have held the program invalid only as to
sectarian institutions and would have remanded to determine the sectarian character of the
colleges.
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noted that religious indoctrination was not a substantial purpose of
the colleges and that college students were not so susceptible to
religious teachings. Moreover, the very nature of a college curriculum tended to curb sectarian influence and reduce the risk that the
primary effect would be to encourage or support religious activities.
Entanglement was found not to be excessive because the inspection
necessary to determine that the facilities were devoted to secular
education would be "minimal."
These cases, decided in 1971, appeared to shut off direct financial aid to church-related elementary and high schools, while opening the way for such support to church-affiliated colleges. They
also set the stage for a decade of intensive litigation, as state governments tried to channel money to religious schools, while avoiding the interdictions of Lemon. Paying for support services, and
providing grants and tax benefits to parents who send children to
private schools were the methods employed by supporters of religious education to test anew the contours of establishment clause
limitations on aid to religious education. The Court's response to
these efforts shaped the law in this area in the years following
Lemon.
III. Lemon and Tilton Applied in the 1970's: Fine Lines and a
Divided Court
A.

Tax Benefits to Help Pay Tuition

If Lemon struck a blow at direct grants in the form of paying for
the cost of secular subjects, Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,4 1 decided in 1973, appeared to erect a similar
barrier against tuition grants and the use of the tax system to provide cash benefits to parents who send children to religious schools.
State aid to reduce tuition costs was a natural fallback from the direct assistance plan held invalid in Lemon. If parents could receive
grants, or a tax break in the form of a tax credit or deduction, resulting from tuition payments to religious schools, then these benefits could be passed along to the religious schools through tuition
increases that would be cost-free to the parents. This was behind
the New York State plan held invalid in Nyquist, the first case involving financial assistance to religious schools to be decided by a Court
with the four new Nixon appointees.
Actually, the statute in Nyquist created three programs of financial assistance to religious schools, two of which involved tuition
assistance. The third provided for grants of $30 to $40 per year per
student (depending on the age of the facility) for "maintenance and
41

413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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repair of. . . school facilities and equipment to ensure the health,
welfare and safety of enrolled pupils" in nonpublic schools serving
a high concentration of low income families. The maintenance and
repair provision was struck down in a unanimous opinion written
by Justice Powell "because their effect, inevitably, is to subsidize
42
and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools."
A second program reimbursed low income parents (below
$5,000) for 50% of tuition paid to nonpublic schools up to an
amount not exceeding $50 for grade school and $100 for high
school. In New York State 85% of the children attending nonpublic schools were in religiously-affiliated schools. This tuition reimbursement program similarly failed the "effect" prong of the Lemon
test. Everson and Allen were distinguished as involving welfare and
educational measures that benefitted children and did not involve
expenditures for religious courses. Although three justices dissented (the ChiefJustice and Justices White and Rehnquist),Justice
Powell emphasized that
it is precisely the function of New York's law to provide assistance to private schools, the great majority of which are sectarian. By reimbursing parents for a portion of their tuition bill,
the State seeks to relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to
assure that they continue to have the option to send their children to religion-oriented schools .... [T]he effect of the aid
was unmistakably to provide 43desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.
The third statute allowed middle income families (those with
incomes between $5000 and $25,000) whose children attended
nonpublic schools, to deduct a specified amount from their adjusted gross income. As described in the opinion, the deduction
was not related to a parent's actual expenditure but was based on a
formula that was "apparently the product of a legislative attempt to
assure that each family would receive a carefully estimated net benefit, and that the tax benefit would be comparable to, and compatible with, the tuition grant for lower income families." 44 The
majority concluded that "there would appear to be little difference,
for purposes of whether such aid has the effect of advancing religion, between the tax benefit allowed here and the tuition grant
"45

Justice Powell distinguished Walz on grounds that the exemption from property taxes was part of a history of neutrality toward
religion while the special tax benefits in the New York program
42
43
44
45

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

779-80.
783.
790.
790-91.
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to aid and advance...

religious institutions. ' 46 Moreover, the Walz exemption was not
limited to churches, while the benefits of the New York statute
flowed primarily to those sending their children to sectarian
schools. "Without intimating whether this factor alone might have
controlling significance in another context in some future case,"
wrote Justice Powell, "it should be apparent that in terms of the
potential divisiveness of any legislative measure the narrowness of
the benefitted class would be an important factor." 47 Picking up on
this "political divisiveness" theme, Justice Powell, in a separate portion of the opinion, emphasized that while it was not necessary to
consider the "entanglement" issue, "the importance of the competing societal interests implicated here prompts us to make the further observation that, apart from any specific entanglement of the
State in particular religious programs, assistance of the sort here
involved carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader
48
sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion."
If, as the Court majority believed, 49 the establishment clause
should prevent direct government assistance to religious education,
the Nyquist result was as necessary as that in Lemon. Both programs
would have involved the state in massive funding of religious
schools. There could be no "neutrality" in such programs. Those
religions that support religious schools would benefit at the expense of those that do not. Both programs posed threats to religious diversity, religious harmony, and ultimately to religious
freedom.
Perhaps if the Court had simply applied the Everson dicta, Nyquist (and Lemon) might have been easier cases. But the three-part
test, which served to focus on the dangers when church and state
become joint venturers in the educational process, had the disadvantage of compartmentalizing the issue into discrete "tests,"
thereby overlooking the broader implications of a particular program. The New York tuition assistance program in Nyquist demonstrates the problem. "Purpose" is not easy to define; it is difficult to
conclude that there is no secular purpose to a program of aid to
parents whose children attend religious schools. Tuition grants, or
tax credits, do not involve administrative entanglements. One is
left with the rather elusive concepts of "effect" or "political
entanglement."
The "effect" test inevitably involves a discussion over whether
46 Id. at 793.
47 Id. at 794.
48 Id.
49 Justice Powell's opinion contains a long footnote adopting the Everson-McCollum-Engel view of the historical basis of the establishment clause. 413 U.S. at 770-71 n.28.
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the forbidden "effect" must be a "primary" effect. Justice Powell,
in a footnote in Nyquist, attempted to answer the argument that the
"primary effect" was not to subsidize religion but to promote the
secular purpose of perpetuating a pluralistic environment and protecting the fiscal integrity of overburdened public schools. Justice
Powell wrote: "We do not think such metaphysical judgments are
either possible or necessary. Our cases simply do not support the
notion that a law found to have a 'primary' effect to promote some
legitimate end under the State's police power is immune from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct and im50
mediate effect of advancing religion."
The political divisiveness argument is open to the criticism that
any program that provides some financial benefit to religious
schools (including the Everson statute) creates a threat of political
divisiveness along religious lines. Justice Powell's answer, focusing
on annual appropriations for a program confined to a religious constituency, is a persuasive answer to some. Others argue, however,
that constitutional issues should not depend on the degree of political controversy engendered by a program or by litigation. 5 '
As the three-part test of Lemon was applied in Nyquist, the New
York program failed because a specified sum of money was given to
parents of children in parochial schools in the form of grants or
tuition benefits and the only beneficiaries were parents of children
attending private schools, most of which were religiously oriented.
Actually, the New York programs should have been invalidated for
a more forthright reason: They involved direct and unrestricted financial grants to religious schools through the devious device of a
cash benefit to the parents. By focusing on "effect" and "entanglement" as separate issues, the path was opened for possibly upholding tuition benefit programs that aided public school, as well as
private school, parents and that provided a less specific amount of
cash benefit per student. If "effect" could be muddied, and the
constituency for the benefits broadened beyond the narrow religious constituency, it might be possible to distinguish the Nyquist
opinion. But such concerns were for a later day. In the meantime
the Court, in Nyquist, had turned back a rather blatant effort to funnel significant dollars to religious schools.
If Nyquist helped shut the door on direct aid to religious elementary and secondary schools, the Burger Court continued to per50 Id. at 783-84 n.39.
51 Later opinions referred to the political divisiveness argument as an "elusive inquiry"
and sought to limit its application to cases where "direct financial subsidies are paid to
parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 40304 n.l 1 (1983). See also the discussion of this issue in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355,
1364-65 (1984), and text accompanying notes 106-11 infra.
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mit expanded aid to church-related colleges. In Hunt v. McNair,52
decided on the same day as Nyquist, the Court, relying on Tilton,
upheld a construction aid program that permitted all colleges, regardless of religious affiliation, to borrow funds at low interest rates
through the use of state-issued revenue bonds. The 5-4 majority in
Tilton increased to 6-3 as Justices Powell and Rehnquist (both with
the new majority) replaced Justices Harlan and Black, who had
been on opposite sides in Tilton. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Douglas dissented from Justice Powell's majority opinion and argued that the state would have to police college affairs during the
life of the bonds to make certain that public funds were not being
53
used for sectarian construction.
Three years later, by a similar 6-3 majority (Justice Stevens re54
placed Justice Douglas in dissent) the Court in Roemer v. Maryland
followed Tilton and Hunt, upholding a program of annual noncategorical grants to private colleges, irrespective of church affiliation,
as long as the funds were not used for sectarian purposes. The distinction between aid to colleges and to elementary and secondary
schools was firmly established. "Entanglement" and "effect"
evoked less concern in a college setting.
B. Support Services
Having failed in their effort to obtain massive direct grants
(Lemon) and indirect grants through tuition assistance (Nyquist), the
proponents of financial aid to religious schools turned to a more
selective approach-reimbursement for the cost of providing auxiliary secular services such as student testing and diagnostic, therapeutic, and remedial services. The cases in which the Court
considered these issues in the latter part of the decade appeared to
draw very fine, and arguably arbitrary, distinctions. When one considers, however, the evolution of the Court's thinking on these issues, it was inevitable that the results would turn on narrow issues
of fact. Everson had ruled that some programs of state assistance to
children attending religious schools were permissible even though
religious schools were the indirect financial beneficiaries. Moreover, the state clearly could provide medical services to children in
religious schools, and, indeed, might be precluded by free exercise
considerations from denying such benefits. And Allen (lending of
textbooks) had validated some forms of educational assistance to
religious schools. On the other hand, the Court in Lemon and Nyquist had rejected what would have been open-ended financial aid.
52 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
53 Id. at 752.
54 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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By eschewing an all-or-nothing approach, the Court committed itself to a case-by-case evaluation of government aid programs in an
effort to limit the quantity of aid, and the nature of the government
involvement, so that church and state would not become financial
and administrative partners in the process of elementary and secondary education.
In the first of these cases, Levitt v. Committee for Public Education
& Religious Liberty, 55 decided the same day in 1973 as Nyquist, the
Court struck down a New York law that reimbursed private schools
for the cost of administering state-mandated tests. The tests were
both state-prepared and teacher-prepared. Because the latter involved the discretion of teachers supervised by religious institutions, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion (only Justice White
dissented) concluded that there was a substantial risk the tests
could be used for religious indoctrination. Moreover, the lumpsum, per-pupil, method of reimbursement was not related to the
actual cost of the tests. Later cases permitted reimbursement for
the actual cost of having private school personnel administer and
56
grade state-mandated and state-prepared tests.
Meek v. Pittenger,57 decided in 1975, dealt with Pennsylvania's
efforts to overcome the "entanglement" hurdle by providing for a
range of auxiliary support services to be furnished in the private
schools by public school personnel. The services included counseling, psychological services, speech and hearing therapy, testing and
related services for exceptional or educationally disadvantaged students, and educational material and equipment such as maps,
charts, films, records, periodicals, projectors, recorders and laboratory paraphernalia. Of the nonpublic schools eligible for the assistance, 75% were church-affiliated. The State sought to distinguish
Lemon on the basis of the subject matter of the services and the fact
that public school personnel would perform the services.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion5 8 rejected both of these distinctions. Relying both on "effect" and "entanglement," the Court
concluded that the State must be certain that the subsidized teachers do not teach religion, whether the class be "remedial arithmetic" or "medieval history."5 9 Addressing the issue of the use of
public school teachers, Justice Stewart pointed out that they were
55 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
56 See Wollman v. Waiter, 433 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1977).
57 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
58 Justices Blackmun and Powell joined Part V ofJustice Stewart's opinion invalidating
the "remedial" auxiliary services provision of the Pennsylvania program. Justices Brennan,
Douglas and Marshall joined Part V, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, dissenting from the
majority's sustaining of textbook loan provisions that were upheld on the basis of Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
59 421 U.S. at 371.
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"performing important educational services in schools in which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in
which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained." 60 Excessive entanglement would result from the need of the state to engage in surveillance of its own
personnel to ensure that they remained religiously neutral. The
opinion also mentioned the danger of political divisiveness, 61 a
point introduced earlier in Lemon and Nyquist. The loan of instruc62
tional material was similarly invalid.
Significantly, however, the near-unanimity of Levitt was absent
in Meek, as the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist now joined Justice White in dissent, arguing that there was no support for the conclusion that the public school teachers would attempt to teach
religion or that the programs would produce political divisiveness.
The dissents were particularly bitter, with the Chief Justice condemning the majority for penalizing children "because of their parents' choice of religious exercise," and arguing that this denial of
remedial assistance constituted a "denial of equal protection, which
is, for me, a gross violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights
. ... 63 Meek was the first indication that a growing minority was
prepared to accept financial aid in the form of government furnishing of secular support services by public school teachers on the
premises of parochial schools. 64
Wollman v. Walter,65 decided in 1977, involved an Ohio statutory scheme designed to respond to the majority's objections in
Meek. Under the Ohio plan, diagnostic services (psychological,
hearing and speech) were performed by public school personnel on
parochial school premises, presumably because these were analogous to health and welfare services provided by the state to all children. Therapeutic and remedial services, on the other hand, would
be performed off the premises of the private school. A divided
Court upheld these provisions. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion accepted the arguments that the limited contact between diagnostician and child in the parochial school did not pose the risk of
the teaching of religion, and that the performance of the remedial
tasks by public school personnel on sites not identified with sectarian schools minimized the dangers of entanglement. Justices Bren60 Id.
61 Id. at 372 n.22.
62 The lineup of the Court on this issue was the same as in Part V. See note 58 supra.
63 421 U.S. at 386-87.
64 The Chief Justice, and Justices White and Rehnquist would have also upheld the
sections of the law providing for the lending of instructional materials.
65 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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nan and Marshall would have invalidated the remedial services
provisions, even if conducted off premises.
While accepting the on-premises/off-premises distinction for
remedial educational programs, Woliman adhered to the precedents
of earlier cases by sustaining the provisions that authorized funds
for textbooks and striking down reimbursement for instructional
materials, equipment, and field trip services.
Thus, the Court, by 1977, had drawn a distinction between remedial services (permissible only if performed by public school employees off the premises of the religious school) and diagnostic
services (permissible if performed by public school employees even
on religious school premises). As for remedial services, it appeared
that four Justices (Powell, Blackmun, Stewart, and Stevens) drew
the line at the parochial schoolhouse door. Justices Brennan and
Marshall rejected the distinction and would have found a constitutional violation whether the services were performed on or off parochial school premises, while the Chief Justice 66 and Justices White
and Rehnquist similarly rejected the distinction but reached the opposite constitutional conclusion. On diagnostic services, only Justice Brennan dissented from Wollman's approval of reimbursement
for diagnostic services performed by public school employees on
religious school premises.
These distinctions, which provoked sharp differences on the
Court, bore some relationship to establishment clause concerns
even if one were to conclude that the distinctions did not warrant
the different conclusions. Teaching of religion is less likely to occur
in the course of diagnosing a learning problem. Therefore, surveillance, and the consequent entanglement, is far less necessary. Remedial teaching, on the other hand, may become indistinguishable
from "normal" teaching, particularly if it involves "enrichment"
courses. To allow public school teachers to engage in remedial
teaching in religious schools would open the way for extensive financial support of religious schools and would require constant policing to ensure that these funds were not being diverted for
religious purposes. Admittedly, remedial teaching outside religious schools could also trigger substantial government expenditures and some administrative entanglement, but the religious
schools are probably not inclined to expand their reliance on such
programs because they tend to defeat the very purpose for which
66 The ChiefJustice's position after Wollman was not completely clear, since he joined
in Part VI of the Court's opinion which upheld the provision of therapeutic services off the
premises of the religious schools, and which reaffirmed the Meek distinction between the
religious school premises and a "neutral" site. However, in light of the Chief Justice's
strong dissent from that portion of the Meek opinion, the ChiefJustice in Wollman undoubtedly was simply agreeing with the majority's conclusion that the provision was valid.
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religious schools are established-the placing of children in a pervasively religious environment for most of the formative educational years. The religious school authorities would be very much
inclined, however, to draw public school teachers into the process
of religious education if these teachers were permitted to perform
"remedial" services in religious schools.
Given a constitutional framework where some programs that
provide financial aid are valid (Everson and Allen), but not all forms
of aid to religious schools for providing secular services are permissible (Lemon), the entanglement prong of the Lemon test, interpreted
to require that only public school employees may render educational support services (whether remedial or diagnostic) and actual
instruction of students (remedial or otherwise) be performed by
such employees away from private religious schools, is a useful tool
to keep the two educational systems separate.
IV. The Reagan Election: A New Political Agenda and New
Pressures on the Wall of Separation
As the decade of the 1970's drew to a close, one might have
concluded that a rather solid Court majority agreed on the broad
principles of establishment clause law: Government cannot support religious practices and institutions; government must be neutral in its dealing with religion; and secular programs must be
conducted so as to avoid government support for, and excessive
entanglement in, religious institutions and activities. There appeared little likelihood of a change of heart on the school prayer
issue, and the cases involving support services for religious schools
were turning on narrow factual issues, with a majority of six justices
(or possibly seven, depending on the ChiefJustice) having applied
the Lemon test effectively to preclude significant direct government
assistance to parochial schools. OnlyJustices Rehnquist and White,
and more recently the Chief Justice, seemed to question consistently the underlying premises of Lemon, Nyquist and Meek.
The first significant church-state case of the 1980's certainly
gave no indication of any change in direction. In Stone v. Graham,67
a per curiam opinion, the Court invalidated a Kentucky statute that
required public school officials to post a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private contributions, in every public
classroom. Each plaque bore a notation explaining the purpose of
the display as demonstrating secular application of the Ten Commandments "in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States." 68 The
67
68

449 U.S. 39 (1980).
It-at 41.
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Court concluded that the statute served no secular purpose. Because the Ten Commandments is "a sacred text in the Jewish and
Christian faiths, no legislative recitation of secular purpose could
blind us to that fact." Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, objected to this
summary rejection of the secular purpose articulated by the Kentucky legislature. The Chief Justice, and Justices Blackmun and
Stewart, objected to the Court's summary reversal, without indicating their views on the merits.
But political events were starting to run counter to the Court's
constitutional doctrines. The election of President Reagan in November 1980 brought to the White House a President supported by
a religious constituency that had long been critical of the Court's
decisions in the school prayer area. 6 9 A constitutional amendment
to overturn Engel v. Vitale was high on the "social issues" agenda of
the Reagan presidency. As part of his "pro-religion" program, the
President also promoted financial aid to religious schools, focusing
primarily on a tuition tax credit proposal similar to the New York
program found unconstitutional in Nyquist. 70 As has happened so
often, the Supreme Court's judicial agenda soon reflected the country's political agenda as church-state issues moved to the front
burner. By the end of the 1983-1984 Term, a new series of cases
heralded increased judicial receptivity to government involvement
with religion.
A.

Widmar v. Vincent: "EqualAccess"for Religious Speech

If separation of church and state has been a principal theme in
establishment clause law, at least since 1947, one of the countervailing themes has been the concept of "accommodation." Justice
Black wrote in Everson that the first amendment does not require
that the state and religious groups be adversaries. 7 1 In upholding
the New York released time program in Zorach v. Clauson, Justice
Douglas wrote that when the state encourages religious instruction
it "respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates
the public service to their spiritual needs." 72 And in Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York, Chief Justice Burger, in upholding the real
property tax exemption for churches, wrote that the principle of
69 See generally ProposedConstitutionalAmendment to Permit Voluntary Prayer: HearingsBefore
the Senate Comm. on theJudiary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). For the 1984 voluntary school
prayer amendment debate, see 130 CONG. REc. S2879 (daily ed. March 20, 1984). A silent
prayer amendment was tabled prior to the above debate. See 130 CONG. REC. S2850 (daily
ed. March 19, 1984).
70 S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1335-38 (daily ed. February 17,
1983). In November of 1983, the Senate rejected the president's proposed tuition tax
credit program; see New York Times, Nov. 17, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
71 330 U.S. at 18.
72 343 U.S. at 314.
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government neutrality toward religion "derives from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses" that prevents "governmental control of churches or governmental restraint
73
on religious practice."
Of course, some "accommodation" with religion is necessary
in order to recognize an individual's rights under the free exercise
clause. Sherbert v. Verner,74 decided in 1963, held that a state could
not deny unemployment benefits to a woman whose religious belief
prevented her from working on Saturday. To regard this exception
to an otherwise valid secular law as an "establishment" would place
the two great religion clauses in irreconcilable conflict. The Court
has, quite properly, also recognized that the state may alleviate burdens on free exercise, even if the burdens do not rise to the level of
75
a constitutional violation. In one of the Sunday closing law cases,
for example, the Court, while holding that a New York Sunday closing law did not violate the free exercise rights of an Orthodox Jew,
suggested that the state could provide an exemption for those
whose religious beliefs required that their businesses remained
closed on Sundays. 7 6 And in Walz, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
"The limits of permissive state accommodation to religion are by
no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the
77
Free Exercise Clause."
The aggressive posture of the evangelical religious groups has
led to the claim that students in public schools had a "right" to
engage in group prayer at the start of the day, and that children
attending parochial schools were the victims of discrimination because of their religion if they were denied educational programs
available to others. It was but a small step to argue that state support for public religious observances, or government financial support for religious schools, was an "accommodation" to religious
belief which, even if not required by the free exercise clause, was
the type of cooperation that the establishment clause permitted.
Widmar v. Vincent, 78 decided in 1981, lent some support for this
argument. The University of Missouri at Kansas City had adopted a
regulation prohibiting the use of university buildings or grounds
"for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching." The regulation was challenged by an evangelical Christian students organization on first amendment and equal protection clause grounds.
73 397 U.S. at 669-70.
74 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
75 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
76 Such an exemption was upheld in Arlan's Dep't Store of Louisville, Inc. v. Kentucky,
357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 218 (1962).
77 397 U.S. at 673.
78 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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Justice Powell's majority (8-1) opinion concluded that once the University created a forum generally open to student groups, it could
not impose a content-based exclusionary rule against religious
speech. As a free speech case, Widmar was unexceptional: An urban public university, unlike a primary or secondary school, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum, and the
University's own regulations created a forum for student groups.
The case had establishment clause ramifications, however, because the state sought to justify its exclusion of student religious
groups on grounds that religious teaching and worship on the
premises of a public university was an establishment of religion.
AlthoughJustice Powell's opinion emphasized that the case was decided on the "bases of speech and association rights,"7 9 and that
there was no conflict with the establishment clause, the Court appeared to be mandating a practice-religious activity (even
prayer)--on the premises of a public educational institution. Justice Powell was careful to note that "an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of State approval on
religious sects or practices," 8 0 but it was not long before proponents of school prayer argued that student religious clubs had a
right, despite the establishment clause, to conduct meetings and
prayers in elementary and high schools.
The regulation in Widmar was held to be a free speech violation. The result in Widmar posed a threat to establishment concerns
only if it could be argued that the student activity in Widmar should
be allowed as an "accommodation" to free speech rights even in
those cases where there was no free speech violation. This was essentially the claim raised by religious groups seeking to use Widmar
as a basis for bringing organized religious activity into public elementary and high schools. "Equal access" became the key to open
the schoolhouse door. 81
B.

Mueller v. Allen: A Shift Away From Nyquist

It will be recalled that in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,82 decided in 1973, the Court appeared to have concluded that
the state could not use the tax system to reimburse a taxpayer for a
79 Id. at 273 n.13.
80 Id. at 274.
81 See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646
(11th Cir. 1984); Brandon v. Board of Educ. of Guilderland Central School Dist., 635 F.2d
971 (2d Cir. 1980); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1982); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir.
1985). Congress provided for limited "equal access" to religious groups in public schools
through the Equal Access Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302 et. seq. (1984).
82 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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fixed amount of money where the tax benefit is earned primarily by
those paying tuition to religious schools. Justice Powell's opinion,
for a 6-3 majority, was based on the "effect" prong of the Lemon
test, and also emphasized the dangers of political divisiveness inherent in the New York tuition tax benefit law.
Nyquist, and its companion case,8 3 involved benefits only for
those parents whose children attended private schools in states
where the effect of the program was to provide benefits almost entirely to those attending religious schools. Moreover, since they involved specified cash benefits to individual taxpayers, the tax
savings could easily be calculated and passed along to the private
religious school in the form of higher tuition. The possibility existed, therefore, that a benefit in the form of a deduction from taxable income (rather than a specified dollar amount), extended to
parents of children in public schools, might survive constitutional
challenge.
Minnesota exploited these possibilities by enacting a law that
provided for a deduction from taxable income of up to $500 in
some grades and $700 in others. The deductions were available
not only to parents of children attending private schools, but also
to parents of public school students. Expenses could be deducted
for such items as tuition paid by public school children to attend
school outside their home district, summer school tuition, tuition
for instruction provided for the physically handicapped, and costs
of transportation and textbooks.
On the basis of these differences, a 5-4 majority in Mueller v.
Allen, 84 decided in 1983, upheld the Minnesota statute even though
it was estimated that approximately 96% of the children in private
schools attended religious schools. Justice Rehnquist, one of the
Nyquist dissenters, wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by
the two other Nyquist dissenters, the ChiefJustice andJustice White,
and by the newest member of the Court, Justice O'Connor. The
decisive switch was that of Justice Powell, who wrote the Nyquist
opinion but who joined the new majority in Mueller. Justice Stevens, who was not on the Court in 1973, now seemed firmly aligned
with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in opposition to
programs of financial support for religious schools.
In deciding that the Minnesota law did not have the "effect" of
advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools, Justice
Rehnquist placed principal emphasis on the availability of the deduction to all parents. Also, this was one of many deductions permitted under the Minnesota tax system. Even though Widmar was
83
84

Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 423 U.S. 472 (1973).
463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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explicitly based, as noted above, on the free speech rights of the
student religious groups, Justice Rehnquist cited Widmar as authority for the proposition that when benefits are extended to a broad
spectrum of groups, it is an "important index of secular effect." 8 5
Nor could a secular purpose be discerned from the fact that the
overwhelming portion of the tax benefits flowed to parents of religious school children. Although the class of beneficiaries was
clearly a factor in Nyquist, Justice Rehnquist concluded: "We would
be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially
neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various
classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law." 8 6
One could easily argue, as did Justice Marshall in his strong
dissent, that the difference between the New York law in Nyquist and
the Minnesota law did not warrant different results under the "effect" prong. Fewer than 100 of the 90,000 children who attend
public schools pay a "general tuition. .

.

. Parents who send their

children to free public schools are simply ineligible to obtain the
full benefit of the deduction except in the unlikely event that they
buy $700 worth of pencils, notebooks, and bus rides for their
school-age children." 87 Moreover, there was no doubt that the entire scheme was designed to provide a tax break that could be
passed along to the religious schools in the form of higher tuition.
While the amount of the benefit resulting from a deduction varied
in accordance with the parents' taxable income, virtually all taxpayers benefitted to some extent, and private schools would have little
difficulty in becoming the indirect beneficiaries of the state's generosity. "For the first time," wrote Justice Marshall, "the Court has
upheld financial support for religious schools without any reason at
all to assume that the support will be restricted to the secular function of those schools and will not be used to support religious
instruction." 88
As with most of the establishment clause cases decided during
the period 1981-1984, Mueller v. Allen could be viewed either as a
major departure from precedent and the forerunner of extensive
government support for religious schools, or rather as a case involving facts sufficiently different from prior cases so that the statute could be sustained without undermining the earlier cases. On
the one hand, Nyquist was reaffirmed and the Lemon three-part test
applied; the Minnesota and New York laws did differ, and the issue
of a tax deduction had been specifically reserved in Nyquist.8 9 On
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 397.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 416-17.
413 U.S. at 790 n.49.
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the other hand, Justice Rehnquist's opinion opened the way for the
possible infusion of considerable government support for religious
schools with no attempt to tie such aid to the secular functions of
the schools.
Justice Rehnquist, moreover, sounded a note that was to be
heard again in later cases when he observed that the "attenuated
financial benefit . . that eventually flows to parochial schools" 90
does not pose the danger that led to the inclusion of the establishment clause in the Bill of Rights. This reflects a "let's look at the
big historical picture" attitude that seeks to overlook "minor" benefits or "accommodations" to religious institutions. 9' Actually
James Madison, in his Remonstrance, warned: "That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the support of one establishment, may force him to
conform to any 6ther establishment in all cases whatsoever." 9 2 But
Justice Rehnquist, in Mueller and in later cases, suggested that the
"historic purpose" of the establishment clause involved something
more significant than the seemingly petty distinctions that occupied
the attention of the Court during the 1970's. The effect of this approach is to denigrate the body of precedent that had evolved since
Everson. If one can then define the "historic purpose" as only to
prevent a state church, or discrimination among religious sects,
Madison's warning could become a reality.
Crucial to the ultimate significance of Mueller was the question
of whether it could be a precedent for upholding the constitutionality of the federal tuition tax proposal being pushed in Congress by
the Reagan Administration. This would determine whether Mueller
was, indeed, the forerunner of massive government support for parochial education. Congressional proposals for a nationwide program of tuition tax credits differ in several important respects from
the program upheld in Mueller. The essence of the Reagan proposal is a credit against tax liability of an amount equal to statutory
maximums ($300 in the bill proposed by the Administration in
1983). 9 3 To meet the constitutional standard set by the majority in
Mueller, a tuition tax credit proposal would, at a minimum, have to
be available to children in public as well as private schools. This
90 463 U.S. at 400.
91 See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3243 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
The Court. . . strikes down nondiscriminatory nonsectarian aid to educationally
deprived children from low income families. The Establishment Clause does not
prohibit such sorely needed assistance; we have indeed travelled far afield from the
concerns which prompted the adoption of the First Amendment when we rely on
gossamer abstractions to invalidate a law which obviously meets an entirely secular
need.
92 Reproduced in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 63, 65-66.
93 See note 70 supra.
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would sharply escalate the cost by allowing deductions for tuition
and other expenses that some states, like Minnesota, may presently
charge public school parents. It would also tempt states to charge
for some public school expenses that are now free, because a significant part of the cost would be borne by the federal government in
the form of the income tax deduction. Since states have varying
practices with regard to charging expenses to public school children, a program of federal tax deductions for such expenses would
benefit parents unevenly, depending on the laws of their particular
state.
Apart from these political problems, the proposals in Congress
clearly do not conform to the feature that the majority found critical in Mueller-that the benefit was in the form of a deduction and
not a specified credit. The sharply progressive federal tax system
highlights the unequal impact of a tax deduction on taxpayers.
Thus, while the Court may have opened the door to the flow of
public money to religious schools through tax benefits to parents of
parochial school children, the constitutional standard established in
Mueller may be quite costly, particularly if it encourages states to
start charging for expenses to public school children. It may also
create political and administrative problems that may make the
whole idea far less attractive than a simple tuition tax credit of the
type held invalid in Nyquist. Of course, three justices dissented in
Nyquist itself,94 and with the addition ofJustice O'Connor, and with
a program that is less blatant in providing benefits exclusively to a
religious constituency, Mueller v. Allen could be the authority for upholding significant federal support for religious schools.
Political divisiveness, which was emphasized in Lemon, Nyquist,
and Meek, was casually disposed of in a footnote in Mueller v. Allen.
Justice Rehnquist simply ignored the Nyquist precedent and concluded that the language in Lemon respecting political divisiveness
"must be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial
schools." 9 5 Thus, Mueller provided the opportunity for a very limiting interpretation of an important component of the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. This, too, would be significant in
later cases.
C.

Legislative Chaplains: HistoricalException or Still
More Accommodation

Shortly after Mueller v. Allen, at the close of the 1982-1983
94
95

ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist.
463 U.S. at 403-04 n.1I.
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Term, the court, in Marsh v. Chambers,9 6 held that paid legislative
chaplains and opening prayers at the start of each session of the
Nebraska legislature were not establishment clause violations.
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion (6-3) was based almost entirely on historical analysis, emphasizing that the practices challenged were identical to those adopted by the very Congress that
approved the first amendment in 1789. Moreover, the issue of legislative chaplains was actually considered by the Framers of the first
amendment and apparently not viewed as the type of evil that the
establishment clause was designed to prevent. ChiefJustice Burger
also rejected the argument that the clause should be given a more
expansive reading when applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Supporting a narrow view of the case was the
reference to the fact that the complaining party was an adult, an
obvious gesture of deference to the school prayer cases.
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, may have
been accurate in describing the majority opinion as "narrow and,
on the whole, careful. . . and its limited rationale should pose little
threat to the overall fate of the Establishment Clause." 97 But the
Chief Justice's opinion did more than characterize the Nebraska
practice as an historical exception to the establishment clause. In
words that might be applied to school prayer, or other manifestations of government-supported religious practices in public life, the
Chief Justice compared the hiring of a legislative chaplain (in this
case the same one for sixteen years) to the "conduct" approved in
the Sunday closing law cases, and described the practice as "simply
a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among people
of this country." 98
Justice Brennan's dissent questioned the emphasis on the intent of the members of the First Congress, arguing that the Constitution is not a "static document" and that "practices which may
have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and
Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons, the deeply
devout and the nonbelievers alike." 9 9 He concluded that the Nebraska practices were not de minimis or nonsectarian but "will inevitably and continuously involve the State in one or another religious
debate." 10 0 Justice Stevens's dissent was based on the sixteen-year
tenure of a chaplain of one religious faith.
The difference over the role of history that emerged in the
opinions of the ChiefJustice and Justice Brennan was a significant
96
97
98
99

463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Id. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 792.
Id. at 816-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 819.
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shift in what had been the earlier pattern in establishment clause
cases. Starting with the Everson case the separationists on the Court
had virtually monopolized the historical turf, relying on the Virginia experience in 1784 and 1785 to justify reading into the establishment clause the views of Madison and Jefferson that were
articulated so forcefully at that time. The debates in the First Congress were far less clear and one's conclusion about them depended
in large part on trying to fathom the extent to which Madison was
trying to infuse his own views on limitations of state power into an
amendment that limited the federal government.
The ChiefJustice had relied on history to justify the tax benefit
in Walz, as did Justice Rehnquist in Mueller v. Allen. Marsh v. Chambers was further indication that history was rapidly becoming a
weapon for all sides to use.
D.

The Crgche Case: Accommodation Triumphant

The construction of a nativity scene-a cr&he-at public expense on a private park in front of City Hall in Pawtucket, Rhode
Island would appear to be a classic example of conduct that violates
the establishment clause. The use of public funds to construct an
avowedly religious symbol implicates virtually all of the values that
the Court had infused into the establishment clause since 1947.
Justice Black's Everson dicta, and Chief Justice Burger's three-part
Lemon test were designed to guarantee neutrality and maximum
noninvolvement by government in matters of religion. Here was
the absence of neutrality and the essence of involvement-government financial support for the depiction of an event that was of
profound religious significance to one religion and that was, as a
matter of religious belief, rejected by most others.
Nor did the case raise significant countervailing establishment
clause themes. Since citizens did not have a first amendment free
speech right to a government-funded cr&he, the "accommodation" argument in Widmar did not exist. Nor could the state be
viewed as burdening religion by refusing to pay for a crche, as it
might by the imposition of property taxes,' 0' or the drafting of conscientious objectors.102 In the latter situations, an accommodation,
in the form of tax and draft exemptions, would not be considered
an establishment. The creche could not be equated with a textbook; it provided no secular benefit to individuals to warrant even
an analogous argument to the child-benefit theory. The depiction
of the birth of Christ represents to Christians the arrival of God on
earth, and devout Christians would object to characterizing the
101 See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
102 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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event as simply an historical occurrence in Bethlehem nearly 2000
years ago. And there was no long historical exemption that could
be traced back to the First Congress. Indeed, there was persuasive
historical evidence that the secular observance of Christmas was
not a common practice at the end of the eighteenth century.10 3
Both the district and circuit courts had ruled that the Pawtucket
creche was unconstitutional. As an indication of the political-religious agenda of the Reagan Administration, theJustice Department
in an amicus brief urged reversal. ChiefJustice Burger's majority (54) opinion in Lynch v. DonnellyI0 4 was based on an expanded notion
of "accommodation" to religion and on what the Court perceived
to be the essentially secular nature of the Christmas display and
celebration, of which the creche was one component. The Chief
Justice found that the Constitution "affirmatively mandates" accommodation.1 05 Marsh v. Chambers, which might have been viewed
as an historical exception to establishment clause values, was portrayed by the ChiefJustice as an example of the "contemporaneous
understanding" of the establishment clause by the First Congress
in 1789 and a "striking example of the accommodation of religious
beliefs intended by the Framers."' 06 Also cited as "accommodations" to religion were Zorach v. Clauson, "In God We Trust" on
coins, "One Nation under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, and
paintings with a religious message exhibited in the National Gallery
in Washington. Whatever one's view of Zorach, which upheld adjusting the school schedule so that some children could attend religious classes on off-school premises while others remained in the
public school, it is hardly a firm precedent for the construction of
an avowedly religious symbol, recognized as such by the Court.
By viewing the creche "in the context of the Christmas season,"' 0 7 the ChiefJustice was able to apply the three-part Lemon test
to find a "secular purpose" (it "depicts the historical origins of this
traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday"), 08 and a
"primary effect" that does not benefit religion or Christianity ("We
can assume, arguendo, that the display advances religion in a sense
;display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition
of the origins of the holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass,' or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally
103 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1382-84 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
105 Id. at 1359.
106 Id. at 1359-60.
107 Id. at 1362.
108 Id. at 1363.

1124

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1094

supported museums.").1 0 9
As for the "entanglement" prong, the Court found no evidence of "administrative entanglement" and following the approach of Mueller, concluded that in the absence of a direct subsidy
to a religious institution, "no inquiry into potential political divi0
siveness is called for."11
Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority opinion, but wrote
"separately to suggest a clarification of our Establishment Clause
doctrine." It is understandable that the newest member of the
Court should attempt to clarify a confusing and controversial area
of constitutional law, but it is doubtful that her suggested approach
will be any more helpful than the existing three-part Lemon test in
deciding cases. "The Establishment Clause," wrote Justice
O'Conner, "prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community." The government violates the clause through "excessive
entanglement," which Justice O'Connor defined as "institutional
entanglement" rather than "political divisiveness." The latter may
be evidence of the former, or of improper endorsement of religion,
but should not be an "independent ground for holding a government practice unconstitutional.""'
Justice O'Connor would have the "purpose" and "effect"
prongs of Lemon relate to the endorsement of religion: "The purpose prong . . . asks whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval." '" 2
Generally, by defining "effect" in terms of whether the government
action has "the effect of communicating a message" of endorsement or disapproval of religion, Justice O'Connor's approach could
validate many forms of financial aid to religious schools that are of
considerable financial benefit (e.g., the Nyquist or Lemon programs)
but that might not be viewed as "communicating a message of endorsement." It is hard to fathom why "communicating a message
of endorsement or disapproval" significantly clarified "primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger so emasculated the
"purpose" prong in his majority opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly that
Justice O'Connor's formulation, while it did not lead to a different
result with regard to the creche, offered the possibility of a more
109 Id. at 1364.
110 Id. at 1365.
111 Id. at 1366-37 (O'Connor,J., concurring). No Supreme Court decision has relied on
political divisiveness as an "independent ground."
112 Id. at 1368.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

1985]

searching evaluation of governmental intent. Chief Justice Burger
seemed satisfied with any secular purpose, while Justice O'Connor
specifically rejected so lenient a stance: "That requirement is not
satisfied, however, by the mere presence of some secular purpose,
113
however dominated by religious purposes."
Applying her version of the Lemon test to the facts of the creche
case, Justice O'Connor basically reached the same result as Chief
Justice Burger and for the same reason-the creche was part of the
holiday setting of the celebration of Christmas. The purpose was
not to endorse religion, but to celebrate a holiday. And government celebration of the holiday is "not understood to endorse the
religious content of the holiday, just as government celebration of
Thanksgiving is not so understood." 114 Thus, by narrowing the
meaning of "effect" to encompass only endorsement or disapproval, it was easier forJustice O'Connor to conclude that cloaking
a religious symbol in the trappings of a national holiday did not
have a "primary effect" of advancing religion.
In the final analysis the difference between the majority and
justice Brennan's dissent did not derive from "tests" or the meaning of "purpose" and "effect" or even from the different historical
analyses of the celebration of Christmas in the Burger and Brennan
opinions. The essential difference was one of sensitivity to the
meaning of the nativity scene (whether standing alone or as part of
the broader Christmas celebration) to Christians and non-Christians, particularly Jews, for whom the depiction of the birth of
Christ as God represents a fundamental point of departure, of
Christianity from Judaism. The following excerpts from the two
opinions speak eloquently of these different approaches to deeplyfelt religious beliefs:
Chief Justice Burger:
The cr~che, like a painting, is passive; admittedly it is a reminder of the origins of Christmas. Even the traditional, purely
secular displays extant at Christmas, with or without a cr~che,
would inevitably recall the religious nature of the Holiday. ...
It would be ironic, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol
of a particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration
acknowledged in the Western world for 20 centuries ... would
so "taint" the City's exhibit as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause." 15
Justice Brennan:
Unlike such secular figures as Santa Claus, reindeer and
carolers, a nativity scene represents far more than a mere "tradi113
114
115

Id.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1365.
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tional" symbol of Christmas. The essence of the cr&che's symbolic purpose and effect is to prompt the observer to experience
a sense of simple awe and wonder appropriate to the contemplation of one of the central elements of Christian dogma-that
God sent His son into the world to be a Messiah. Contrary to
the Court's suggestion, the cr&he is far from a mere representation of a "particular historic religious event." It is, instead, best
understood as a mystical re-creation of an event that lies at the
heart of Christian faith. To suggest, as the Court does, that
such a symbol is merely "traditional" and therefore no different
from Santa's house or reindeer is not only offensive to those for
whom the crbche has profound significance, but insulting to
those who insist for religious or personal reasons that the story
of Christ is in no sense a part of "history"
nor an unavoidable
16
element of our national "heritage."'

The Court's interpretation of the establishment clause has, as
we have seen, not been a model of consistency. Yet, through a myriad of cases, the Court seems to have sounded a theme that all religious faiths are constitutionally equal, and that believers and
nonbelievers alike can enjoy the uniquely American experience of
being neither included, excluded, or insulted by government because of one's religion. To those who felt excluded because to
them a government-funded nativity scene was either offensive or
insulting, Lynch v. Donnelly conveyed a sad and disappointing
11 7
message.
E.

The End of the 1983-1984 Term: A Look Back and Then Ahead

As the 1984 Term drew to a close, only one case during the
preceding two years, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 11 8 evinced a strong in116 Id. at 1378-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117 See Redlich, Nativity Ruling InsultsJews, New York Times, Mar. 26, 1984, at A19, col.
2; Van Alystyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Commentay on
Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE LJ.301.
118 459 U.S. 116 (1982). Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), might possibly be
considered another example of a strong reaffirmation of establishment clause principles.
The case involved a Minnesota law which imposed registration and reporting requirements
on charitable organizations, but which exempted from regulation those religions that received less than half of their contributions from nonmembers. The Court accepted the
argument of the Unification Church that the law established a governmental preference in
favor of those religions that did not rely on nonmembers for principal financial support.
Given this interpretation, the result was clear. As Justice Brennan's majority opinion
stated: "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." 456 U.S. at 244. The majority applied
a "compelling governmental interest" test and rejected the asserted justifications proffered
by the state. In addition, the entanglement prong of the Lemon three-part test was applied
and the distinctions drawn by the statute were held to engender a risk of politicizing religion. Justices White and Rehnquist argued that the record was not adequate to support the
finding of religious preference, or to reject the state's justifications. Fourjustices (the Chief
Justice and Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor) dissented in the tangential issue of
standing that was present in the case.
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terpretation of the establishment clause. Writing for a near-unanimous Court (only Justice Rehnquist dissented), Chief Justice
Burger held that a Massachusetts statute that gave churches and
schools the power to veto applications for liquor licenses within
500 feet of the church provides an actual and symbolic benefit to
churches, thereby constituting a "primary effect" of advancing religion. The law also "enmeshes churches in the processes of government" and creates the danger of "divisiveness along religious
lines," in violation of the entanglement prong of Lemon. There is
little doubt that the state could enact a law simply preventing bars
from operating within 500 feet of a church or a school. Perhaps the
readily available alternative method of keeping liquor and religion
separate made it easier for the Court to strike down the method
chosen by Massachusetts.
Compared to the other cases decided during the 1982-1983
and the 1983-1984 Terms, however, the issue of whether a state
could allow a church to veto the location of a saloon did not appear
significant. These cases-Marsh v. Chambers, Mueller v. Allen, and
Lynch v. Donnelly-suggested that the shift ofJustice Powell from his
Nyquist position, combined with the addition to the Court ofJustice
O'Connor, could create a majority that would be prepared to reconsider some of the basic establishment clause cases of the past
thirty-seven years. Scheduled to be decided during 1984-1985
were a group of cases that could be the vehicle for such a historic
shift in position.
V. The 1984-1985 Term: Separation to the Fore
Both sides in the controversy over the meaning of the establishment clause worried, and hoped, as the months of the 19841985 Term dragged on. When the Court adjourned on July 2,
1985, those who were fearful a year earlier breathed a collective
sigh of relief. For those who had hoped for a definitively changed
direction there was bitter disappointment. The big news was, essentially, no news. The three major decisions of the Court followed
the pattern of prior precedent.
A.

Silent Prayer: A Matter of Purpose

In 1978 Alabama enacted a law that required teachers, in
grades one through six, to announce a period of silence at the start
of each day's first class "for meditation." A second law was enacted
in 1981 providing that the teacher "may announce that-a period of
silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for
meditation or voluntary prayer. . .

."

In 1982 the Alabama Legis-

lature authorized any teacher or professor "in any public educa-
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tional institution within the state of Alabama" to lead "willing
students" in a prescribed prayer that recognized "Almighty God"
as the "Creator and Supreme Judge of the World."'' 9
Originally all three statutes were challenged, but only the 1981
"meditation or voluntary prayer" statute was at issue in Wallace v.
Jaffree,120 decided on June 4, 1985. Jaffree did not challenge the ruling of the lower federal courts upholding the 1978 "period of silence . . . for meditation" statute. The 1982 statute, with its

prescribed prayer, was found by the district court to have been enacted "to encourage a religious activity." Nevertheless, after a trial
on the merits, the 1982 law was upheld because the district court
concluded that the Supreme Court had misconstrued the establishment clause in its prior opinions and that Alabama could establish a
state-supported religion. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court, and, acting on Alabama's appeal, the
Supreme Court, in 1984, summarily and unanimously affirmed the
Circuit Court's ruling. Engel v. Vitale was alive and well.
The district court had also upheld the 1981 law despite a finding that it, too, had been enacted for religious purposes. The Eleventh Circuit, agreeing with the finding, reversed the district court,
leading to Alabama's appeal. 21
The legislative and judicial history of Wallace v. Jaffree is significant because a so-called "pure moment of silence" law already existed, and "voluntary prayer" was the only meaningful change
accomplished in the 1981 law. The new law could have only been
intended to encourage religious activity, as the district and circuit
courts found. Thus, a "secular purpose" was difficult, if not impossible, to discern. If the first prong of the Lemon test still had life
after Lynch v. Donnelly, the 1981 Alabama law would be difficult to
sustain. By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court agreed. Justices Powell
and O'Connor provided the decisive "switch" votes from Lynch v.
Donnelly.
In one sense Justice Stevens's majority opinion simply applied
precedent to the peculiar facts of the Alabama statute and concluded that the statute had "no secular purpose." The opinion
continued:
The rebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor ...

is con-

firmed by a consideration of the relationship between this
statute and the two other measures that were considered in this
case. .

.

. The Legislature enacted [the 1981 statute] despite

These provisons are set forth in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2481-82 (1985).
120 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
121 The history of the litigation under the three statutes is set forth at 105 S. Ct. at 248286.
119
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the existence of [the 1978 statute] for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one

minute at the beginning of each school day. The addition of"or
voluntary prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not
consistent with the established principle that the Government
122
must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion.
Moreover, the law's sponsor stated, in the legislative record and in
testimony, that the bill was intended "to return voluntary prayer"
123
to public schools.
In a broader sense, however, Wallace v. Jafree was the forum for
a reconsideration of the basic principles that had guided the
Supreme Court in its interpretation of the establishment clause
since 1947. Important indications of the Court's thinking emerged.
First, Justice Stevens's majority opinion reaffirmed the Lemon v.
Kurtzman three-part test, although only the first prong was actually
discussed. Justice Powell's opinion, concurring both in the judgment and with Justice Stevens's opinion, was written "to express
additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-pronged
Lemon test."' 24 In a footnote, Justice Powell referred to Justice
O'Connor's statement in her concurring opinion that the Lemon
standards "should be reexamined and refined" and to Justice
Rehnquist's conclusion that the test be abandoned. 125 Justice Powell's defense of Lemon was most clearly directed at the Chief Justice'sJaffreedissent, in which he referred to the Court's treatment of
Lemon as "a naive preoccupation with an easy bright-line approach
for addressing constitutional issues" and the application of "tidy
formulas by rote."' 126 Justice Powell reminded the Court that only
Marsh v. Chambers had been decided without reference to Lemon, and
that Lemon had not been modified or overruled. He expressed concern that "continued criticism of [Lemon] could encourage other
courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc
.basis."' 27
Justice Powell, as he has in other contexts, 128 was reminding
his colleagues of their stake in the integrity of the judicial process,
and the self-restraining influence of a body of precedent that develops around judicially-created doctrines and standards.
122 Id. at 2491.
123 Id. at 2490.
124 Id. at 2493 (Powell, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 2493-94 n.3.
126 Id. at 2507 (1985) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2494 (Powell, J., concurring).
128 See his opinion in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1021
(1985), (dissenting from the overruling of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)).
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Second, although the Lemon standard was reaffirmed, the Court
may have redefined the "purpose" prong, despite Justice Powell's
admonition that Lemon should be left alone. Lemon, it will be recalled, required that the government action "must have a secular
legislative purpose." One can read the majority opinion inJaffree as
being based on the conclusion that the Alabama law had no secular
purpose; this was Justice Powell's interpretation. 29 But the majority opinion itself, with which Justice Powell concurred, specifically
quoted Justice O'Connor's restatement of the "purpose" prong in
her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly. Justice Stevens wrote,
"inapplying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether the
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.' "130 Justice O'Connor specifically stated in her Lynch concurrence that the existence of some secular purpose would not suffice
if the action was dominated by a religious purpose.131 Her concurrence inJaffree was based on her conclusion that Alabama intentionally endorsed the particular practice of prayer. It was not based on
the lack on any secular purpose. Justice Stevens's formulation
(adopting Justice O'Connor's) could be significant in future cases if
there is a secular purpose that is insignificant compared to the dominant religious purpose.
Third, the majority stated clearly that it intends to apply strict
constitutional standards "whenever the State itself speaks on a religious subject,"' 3 2 thus apparently rejecting the approach, suggested with increasing frequency by the Chief Justice, that the
Court should concern itself only with state practices that are "a step
toward creating an established church,"' 133 or that are dictated by
the "Archbishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome, or some other
powerful religious leaders."' 34 His dissent inJaffree ended with the
disparaging comment, "[t]he mountains have labored and brought
forth a mouse."' 35 Justice Rehnquist had sounded a similar "let'slook-at-the-big-picture" theme in Mueller v. Allen, and he expanded
it in hisJaffree dissent. The majority, however, referred to "the myriad subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be
eroded."' 3 6 Sixjustices continue to view these cases as raising important issues of religious freedom.
Fourth, the majority's holding was a rejection of the "accom129

105 S. Ct. at 2494-95 (Powell, J., concurring).

130 Id. at 2490.
131

104 S. Ct. at 1368 (O'Connor, J, concurring).

132 105 S.Ct. at 2492.
133 Id. at 2507 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
134 Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1365.
135 105 S. Ct. at 2508 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 2493.
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modation to religion" approach forcefully advanced by the Chief
Justice in Lynch and restated in his Jaffree dissent. He described the
Alabama law as one that "affirmatively furthers the values of religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment Clause was
designed to protect. .

.

. It accommodates the purely private, vol-

untary religious choices of the individual pupils who wish to pray
while at the same time creating a time for nonreligious reflection
for those who do not choose to pray."13 7 The United States, in its
amicus brief, similarly asked the Court to regard the Alabama law as
an accommodation that is contemplated by the first amendment's
guarantee of free exercise of religion.138
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, 3 9 which elaborated on
a footnote in the majority opinion, provided a useful analysis for
limiting this potentially open-ended "accommodation" approach to
establishment clause issues. She observed that "complete neutrality" is not the answer to the conflict between the religion clauses.
Strict adherence to Lemon would prevent exemption from such government regulations as the Sunday closing laws. Such exemptions
are hardly neutral toward religion. "On the other hand," she
wrote, "judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause."' 140 Thus, to protect the establishment clause, it
was necessary, in Lemon itself, to adopt the nonneutral position of
denying financial benefits to those who send their children to religious schools.
Justice O'Connor resolved the tension by drawing on the free
exercise derivation of the "accommodation" concept. If the government "lifts a government-imposed burden on the free exercise
of religion.

. .

then the standard Establishment Clause test should

be modified accordingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate
the free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed
burden."141
This analysis, Justice O'Connor concluded, would not save the
Alabama law because the state had imposed no burden on a child's
ability to pray silently in public schools. The only burden lifted by
the statute is the limitation on group silent prayer under state sponsorship. "Phrased in these terms, the burden lifted by the statute is
not one imposed by the State of Alabama but by the Establishment
Clause as interpreted in Engel and Abington. In my view, it is beyond
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 2507-08.
See 105 S. Ct. at 2502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2491 n.45.
Id. at 2504.
Id.
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the authority of the State of Alabama to remove burdens imposed
142
by the Constitution itself."
While Justice O'Connor's analysis is helpful in ruling out the
"accommodation" argument raised injafree, there will be other instances in which it will not be clear whether the state is alleviating a
state-imposed burden on free exercise (e.g., allowing chapels on
military bases), or whether it is engaging in conduct that is otherwise barred by establishment clause concerns (e.g., vocal prayer).
Widmar v. Vincent 143 arguably fell into this uncertain category,
although the Court's recognition of a state university's urban campus as a public forum for student groups required lifting the burden of the state-imposed exclusion of religious groups. Whether
this result can be applied to public high schools, where the requirements of the establishment clause itself might require the exclusion
of religious clubs, is an issue that the Court will be facing in the
44
coming months.1
Finally, and most importantly, the majority rejected two fundamental challenges to constitutional jurisprudence in the churchstate area. A section of Justice Stevens's opinion was devoted to
answering what was described as the "remarkable conclusion" of
the district court that the "Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion." Because no
member of the Court was urging the Court to read the religion
clauses out of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, one
suspects that the real purpose of the discussion was to answer the
long and scholarly opinion of Justice Rehnquist, in which he directly challenged the historical argument, first advanced in Everson,
that the establishment clause was intended to embody the Jefferson-Madison views of separation of church and state. As the following conclusionary paragraph indicates, Justice Rehnquist's
historical analysis, based on the debates of the First Congress, led
him to challenge virtually all of the Court's establishment clause
decisions:
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit
the designation of any church as a "national" one. The Clause
was also designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over
others. Given the "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause
as against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson,
States are prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects. As its history abundantly shows,
142 Id. at 2505.
143 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
144 See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985).
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however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor
does that Clause prohibit congress or the States from pursuing
legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian
means. 145
It is not fair to Justice Rehnquist to summarize briefly his long
and thoughtful opinion. But its historical underpinning is to reject
the argument that Madison carried into the House of Representatives in 1789 the views, shared with Thomas Jefferson, that were
embodied in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (1785) and the Virginia Statute of Religous Liberty in
1786. Justice Rehnquist argued that Madison originally had little
interest in a Bill of Rights, and that his main concern during the
First Congress, as reflected in the debates, was to prevent the establishment of a national religion.
Others, of course, disagree. Justices Black and Rutledge, on
opposite sides in Everson, agreed on the importance of the Virginia
experience in the formulation of the first amendment. Irving
Brandt, in his multi-volume biography of James Madison, traced
the changes in language as the establishment clause evolved during
the First Congress, and concluded that the words "respecting an
establishment of religion" were inserted so that the Amendment
would not be limited to a prohibition on the establishment of a national religion. 14 6 Madison's repeated use of the word "establishment" in his Remonstrance was cited as evidence that he
understood the difference between "established church" and "establishment" and that he intended to make certain that the new
47
government could not "intermeddle with religion."'
Neither side in this historical debate could legitimately claim
that the intent of the Framers could provide an answer to the issue
of prayer in public schools. The separationists looked to the Virginia history, and the views of Madison and Jefferson, to advance
the proposition that the establishment clause was intended to do
more than prevent an established church or discrimination among
religions. Jefferson's wall became the symbolic metaphor, and
while there have been sharp disagreements with regard to particular cases, the Court has derived its constitutional principles from
the Jefferson-Madison philosophy. By challenging the historical
roots from which this philosophy is derived, Justice Rehnquist has
145

105 S.Ct. at 2520. Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on the historical analysis in R.
(1982). See also M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE

CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
WILDERNESS (1965).

146 See I. BRANDT, supra note 7, at 353.
147 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 38 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting the Remonstrance).
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challenged virtually the entire body of precedent developed by the
Court for thirty-seven years. The proper role of history in constitu48
tional ajudication is a subject of considerable scholarly debate,
and neither conservatives nor liberals have been consistent in their
uses of history. Justice Rehnquist is clearly trying to shift the direction of establishment clause law, but thus far he appears to have few
allies.
The majority opinion's citations to Justice Black's Everson dicta
and to Madison's Remonstrance demonstrates continued support
for the Court's traditional historical analysis. 49 Justice Stevens acknowledged, however, that religious freedom may have been understood "at one time" to prohibit only "the preference of one
Christian sect over another. . .. But when the underlying princi-

ple has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court has
unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to
select any religious faith or none at all."' 50 At this point in the
opinion, Justice Stevens quoted Justice Black's Everson dicta that the
first amendment bars "laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another."''
Only Justice White expressed support (short of full endorsement) for Justice Rehnquist's position. "I appreciate Justice Rehnquist's explication of the history of the religion clauses ...
Against that history it would be quite understandable if we undertook to reassess our cases dealing with these clauses."'' 52 While
Chief Justice Burger's emphasis on the dangers of an established
church might lend support to Justice Rehnquist's position, he continued to apply the Lemon test (which Justice Rehnquist's position
would render irrelevant) and, in other contexts, to find establishment clause violations in government conduct that Justice Rehnquist's analysis would sustain.
What does Wallace v. Jaffree predict as to future "moment of
silence" laws? A statute that sets aside a moment of silence, without mentioning prayer, would be sustained unless it can be shown
that its legislative history demonstrated "no secular purpose" or
that it was, in Justice O'Connor's words, "intended to convey a
message of state encouragement of religion." Despite the reality
that religion has probably been involved in "moment of silence"
legislation, at least since Engel v. Vitale, the "secular purpose" prong
148 See Powell, The Original Understanding of Origiani Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985);
Richards, Interpretationand Historiography,58 S. GAL. L. REV. 489 (1985).

149 Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2488-89 nn.3 7 , 38 (1985).
150 105 S. Ct. at 2488.
151 Id. at 2488 n.37.
152 Id. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting).
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may not be difficult to satisfy, even if the legislature has manifested
a sectarian interest. Justice Powell, in his concurrence, stated his
agreement with Justice O'Connor that "some moment-of-silence
statutes may be constitutional."' 53
If the "secular purpose" requirement is met, it is unlikely that a
"moment of silence" law will fail the "effect" test either. Justice
Powell specifically stated that a "moment of silence" law is unlikely
to have the effect of advancing religion. 154 Unless it is implemented
in a sectarian manner, it would be difficult to demonstrate that a law
providing for a moment of silence, enacted with a secular purpose,
had the effect of advancing religion.
More difficult to predict is the fate of a law providing, as did
Alabama's, for a moment of silence for meditation "or silent
prayer." Justice O'Connor would approve a moment of silence law
"drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer, meditation and
reflection . . . without endorsing one alternative over the others
..
,,155 Justice Powell would have upheld the Alabama statute

itself if it had a clear secular purpose. 156 He, like Justice O'Connor,
would probably be satisfied if the legislative history was not as blatant as in Alabama. The majority opinion, moreover, stated that
the intent of the Alabama law was different from "merely protecting
every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day."' 57 Perhaps
different language and history would persuade members of the majority that there was a secular purpose and no proscribed religious
effect in some "meditation or prayer" statutes.
Thus, one can conclude that a "pure" moment of silence law is
probably valid unless the legislative history dilutes the purity. 58 In
today's political environment, with religious leaders actively involved in politics, those who see religious motives in all moments of
silence laws will findJafree of some help. Jafree will be more helpful
in overturning laws that provide for a moment of silence for meditation "or prayer."' 59 Jaffree does not invalidate all such statutes,
but makes their defense more difficult.
Overlooked in the severalJaffree opinions is an important reli153 Id. at 2493 (emphasis added); see Justice O'Connor's comment in her concurring opinon: "It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent,
thoughtful school children." Id. at 2499.
154 Id. at 2495 (Powell, J., concurring).
155 Id. at 2501 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 2495 (Powell, J., concurring).
157 Id. at 2491.
158 See May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D. N.J. 1983) ("one-minute period of
silence" held invalid); contra Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976).
159 See Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D. N.M. 1983) ("or prayer"
statute held unconstitutional).
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gious consideration that should influence the constitutional result.
"Silent prayer," like vocal prayer, can never be nondenominational.
Thus, if one of the objections to vocal prayer was its tendency to
divide' children along religious lines and to place the endorsement
of the state behind one form of religious worship, state-supported
silent prayer raises the same problems. When the state encourages
silent prayer, it endorses a practice that is unacceptable to those
whose faith requires that they pray only in a place of worship, or
before some religious symbol. Some faiths may forbid praying with
members of another faith, or with the opposite sex; some require
believers to stand, or face a certain direction, or sit down, or wear
certain apparel, or be led by ordained spiritual leaders-the variables reflect the infinite capacity of the human spirit to worship God
in different ways. Any state expression of preference for prayer,
whether vocal or silent, destroys the neutral position of the state,
divides us along religious lines, and singles out those who choose
not to pray in public either because of belief or nonbelief. The
Constitution should reflect these differences among our people and
not magnify them. Silent prayer must be an expression of individual choice by the student. All prescribed moments of silence are
highly suspect.
B.

A Day Offfor Sabbath: Accommodation Contained

In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner,160 the Court held that South Carolina violated the free exercise rights of a Seventh Day Adventist who
was denied unemployment insurance benefits because she was unable to accept ajob that required her to work on Saturdays in violation of her religious scruples. In 1981 Sherbert was followed by
Thomas v. Indiana Employment Security Division Review Board,16 1 which
involved a factory worker who was denied unemployment compensation after he had left a job with a weapons manufacturer because
of his religious conviction. Sherbert and Thomas are frequently cited
as examples of permissible accommodations to religion because a
state, if it enacted the exception required by the Court's decisions,
would be alleviating a state-imposed burden on free exercise.
Different considerations are posed when the state compels private employers to lift the burdens that their conditions of employment impose on the religious beliefs and practices of employees.
Title VII, which forbids religious discrimination in employment, requires employers to make "reasonable accommodations" to an employee's religious practices. In TWA v. Hardison,1 62 decided in 1971,
160 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
161 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
162 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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the Court, possibly to avoid establishment clause problems, interpreted Title VII as requiring employers to incur only de minimis
burdens.
Statutes that require employers to accommodate to the religious practices of employees can raise establishment clause
problems. Religious belief can dictate a wide range of employee
practices, and state laws requiring accommodation by employers
could, at some point, confer such broad benefits on religious observers as to be considered establishments of religion.
Lynch v. Donnelly, in which the ChiefJustice stated that the Constitution "affirmatively mandates" accommodation, did not involve
the alleviation of any burdens on a person's exercise of religion,
either by the state or a private person. If the Court could uphold a
cr&che as a permissible accommodation to religion, there was good
reason to believe that the Court might be receptive to state laws
that required broad accommodations by private employers to the
religious practices of employees.
63
The Connecticut statute involved in Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 1
was enacted in 1977 after the state revised its Sunday closing laws
to permit certain classes of businesses to remain open. It provides:
No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work
on such day. An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall
not constitute grounds for his dismissal. 64
Thornton held a management position in one of the stores of a retail chain. He refused to work on Sunday because it was his Sabbath. He also refused an offer of transfer to a management position
in a store in Massachusetts that closed on Sunday, or to a nonsupervisory position within the state at a lower salary. After being transferred to the latter position, he resigned, and a state administrative
agency found that he had been discharged in violation of the statute. The Connecticut Supreme Court found the law unconstitutional, failing all three aspects of the Lemon test.
In a rare display of unanimity, the Supreme Court, with only
Justice Rehnquist dissenting, found the Connecticut statute had a
"primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religion's
practice." 165 ChiefJustice Burger's majority opinion accepted what
it believed to be the Connecticut Supreme Court's interpretation
that the statute "imposes on employers and employees an absolute
duty to conform their business practices to the particular religious
practices of the employee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath
163
164
165

105 S.Ct. 2914 (1985).
§ 53-303e(b) (Supp. 1962-1984), reproduced at 105 S. Ct. at 2916.
105 S.Ct. at 2918.

CONN. GEN. STAT.
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the employee unilaterally designates." 166 Actually, the State had
argued that the statute, like Title VII, required "reasonable accommodation" and not accommodation at all costs.
Justice O'Connor, applying her version of the "effect" prong
of the Lemon test, agreed with the majority because the statute "con16 7
veys a message of endorsement of the Sabbath observance."'
Her opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, stressed that the law singled out Sabbath observers for special protection. Referring back
to her attempt, in Wallace v. Jaffree, to limit the concept of permissible "accommodation" to religion, Justice O'Connor emphasized
that the Connecticut law, like Title VII, "lifts a burden on religious
practice that is imposed by private employers, and hence is not the
sort of accommodation statute specifically contemplated by the
Free Exercise Clause."' 68 It would, therefore, have to meet the
Lemon three-part test. Title VII meets the test because it provides
for "reasonable accommodation" to religious observances and extends its benefits to all religious beliefs and practices. Thus, "an
objective observer would perceive it as an anti-discrimination law
rather than an endorsement of religion or a particular religious
169
practice."'
Thornton is significant because it declined to apply the "accommodation" approach to a government action that, in many ways,
represented more of an accommodation than Pawtucket's construction of the creche or New York's "released time" program in Zorach. Although the Connecticut statute relieved only a private
burden, the government action in the latter cases relieved no burdens. The Chief Justice has been a proponent of "accommodation," and the Connecticut law presented him with an opportunity
to extend the concept in a situation that would have been seen as
benefiting freedom of worship. Indeed, Thornton's case was supported by some groups that have been most vigorous in arguing for
separation of church and state,' 70 probably in the mistaken belief
that the Connecticut law, even if it compelled an accommodation
that went beyond Title VII, would not be used as an argument for
further accommodation because it was intended to protect free religious exercise. Actually, Justice O'Connor's formulation of the
proper limits of "accommodation" is too narrow, because the
Court has stated, in Walz and the Sunday closing law cases, that the
state's ability to accommodate to state-imposed burdens on reli166
167
168
169
170
ton's

Id.
Id. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
The American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League supported Thornposition.
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gious worship is not limited to those burdens that constitute free
exercise violations. Nevertheless, if the Court adheres to Justice
O'Connor's formulation, even with the Walz modification, as it did
in Thornton and Wallace v. Jaffree, the concept of "accommodation"
may be contained.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, without opinion, suggests that his
Jaffree dissent may leave him with very little to say in establishment
clause cases. Actually, he could have joined the majority on
grounds that the Connecticut law discriminated among religious
sects by benefiting only those faiths that observe a Sabbath. IfJustice Rehnquist, in order to find an establishment clause violation,
requires a more discriminatory law, or one that actually established
a state or national religion, he may find his workload in this area
substantially reduced.
C. Public School Teachers in Religious Schools:
Meek v. Pittenger Revisited
Probably the most important church-state decisions of the term
were announced on the next-to-last day--GrandRapids v. Ball'71 and
Aguilar v. Felton.172 Both involved the same principle that had narrowly divided the Court in Meek v. Pittenger-whether "remedial"
courses could be taught by public school teachers in private
schools. While both involved the same principle, the Grand Rapids
program represented a far more extensive effort by public and religious school authorities to use public financial resources in the cooperative administration of the public and sectarian school systems.
Both programs were held unconstitutional by narrow (5-4) majorities: Grand Rapids' because its effect was to advance religion, and
the New York program in Aguilar because of excessive entanglements. One aspect of the Grand Rapids program was struck down
173
by a 7-2 majority.
The Grand Rapids, Michigan School District developed a twopart program-Shared Time and Community Education. Justice
Brennan, in his majority opinion, concisely described them, and the
facts are highly significant:
The Shared Time program offers classes during the regular
school day that are intended to be supplementary to the "core
curriculum" courses that the State of Michigan requires as a
part of an accredited school program. Among the subjects offered are "remedial" and "enrichment" mathematics, "remedial" and "enrichment" reading, art, music, and physical
171
172
173
gram,

105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985).
105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985).
Only Justices White and Rehnquist voted to uphold the Community Educaton Prodiscussed infra.
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education. A typical nonpublic school student attends these
classes for one or two class periods per week; approximately
"ten percent of any given nonpublic school student's time during the academic year would consist of Shared Time instruction." Although Shared Time itself is a program offered only in
the nonpublic schools, there was testimony that the courses included in that program are offered, albeit perhaps in a somewhat different form, in the public schools as well. All of the
classes that are the subject of this case are taught in elementary
schools, with the exception of Math Topics, a remedial math
course taught in the secondary schools.
The Shared Time teachers are full-time employees of the
public schools, who often move from classroom to classroom
during the course of the school day. A "significant portion" of
the teachers (approximately 10%) "previously taught in nonpublic schools, and many of those had been assigned to the
same nonpublic school where they were previously employed."
The School District of Grand Rapids hires Shared Time teachers
in accordance with its ordinary hiring procedures. The public
school system apparently provides all of the supplies, materials,
and equipment used in connection with Shared Time
instruction.
The Community Education Program is offered throughout
the Grand Rapids community in schools and on other sites, for
children as well as adults. The classes at issue here are taught in
the nonpublic elementary schools and commence at the conclusion of the regular school day. Among the courses offered are
Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, Gymnastics, Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess, Model Building, and Nature
Appreciation. The District Court found that "[a]lthough certain
Community Education courses offered at nonpublic school sites
are not offered at the public schools on a Community Education
basis, all Community Education programs are otherwise available at the public schools, usually as a part of their more extensive regular curriculum."
Community Education teachers are part-time public school
employees. Community Education courses are completely voluntary and are offered only if 12 or more students enroll. Because a well-known teacher is necessary to attract the requisite
number of students, the School District accords a preference in
hiring to instructors already teaching within the school. Thus,
"virtually every Community Education course conducted on facilities leased from nonpublic schools has an instructor otherwise employed full time by the same nonpublic school."74
Although the Court relied on Meek v. Pittenger,t 75 and other
school aid cases, it was clear that Justice Brennan was using this
opportunity to address the issue of aid to religious schools in a
broader context than had earlier discussions. Perhaps because the
174

105 S. Ct. at 3218-19 (citations to district court opinion omitted).

175 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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Grand Rapids program, if upheld, would have virtually wiped away
any significant constitutional barriers to government funding of
religious schools, Justice Brennan addressed the core issue:
whether the Grand Rapids program had the "effect" of advancing
religion. For three reasons the majority concluded that it did.
First, there was a substantial risk of state-sponsored indoctrination of religion. Forty of the forty-one private schools where the
"part-time public schools" were located were "identifiably religious." 176 Shared Time and Community Education teachers were
performing important educational functions as an integral part of
schools whose essential mission was sectarian. The courses were
part of the schools' educational program, unlike diagnostic services
or state-prepared standardized tests. The Community Education
program suffered from the additional defect that virtually all of the
courses were taught by teachers otherwise employed full-time by
the same religious school at which the program was already located.
No effort was made in either program to monitor the course for
religious content. Instead of relying on the "entanglement" prong,
as the Court had done in Lemon and Meek, the majority in Grand
Rapids concluded that "in the pervasively sectarian environment of
a religious school, a teacher may knowingly or unwillingly tailor the
content of the course to fit the school's announced goals." 177 'Thus,
in this context, the danger was not only from the administrative entanglement that would be necessary to prevent state-sponsored
teaching of religion, but rather the substantial risk that no program
of state supervision would succeed.
Second, the Grand Rapids program created a "symbolic union
of government and religion on one sectarian enterprise."' 78 Here
was a factor not sufficiently emphasized in earlier parochial schoolaid cases but which properly focuses on what the "effects" and' "entanglement" tests were trying to accomplish-avoiding the promotion of religion through "a close identification of the powers and
responsibilities [of government] with those of any-or all-religious denominations.

.

.

. ,179

Echoing a theme developed byJus-

tice O'Connor in her Lynch v. Donnelly concurrence, the majority
concluded that school children would not easily perceive the difference between public school and religious school classes, and that
the program would be viewed as a government endorsement of
some faiths and rejection of others. The Court quoted the following excerpt from Judge Henry Friendly's extensive and masterful
176
sively
177
178
179

105 S. Ct. at 3223. Elsewhere in the opinion the schools are described as "pervasectarian." Id. at 3223.
Id. at 3225-26.
Id. at 3227.
Id. at 3226.
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Second Circuit opinion in the companion Aguilar case (involving a
far less ambitious program):
Under the City's plan public school teachers are, so far as appearance is concerned, a regular adjunct of the religious school.
They pace the same halls, use classrooms in the same building,
teach the same students, and confer with the teachers hired by
the religious schools, many of them members of religious orders. The religious school appears to the public as ajoint enterprise staffed with some teachers paid by its religious sponsors
and others by the public.180

The third "effect" was that providing teachers themselves, as
distinguished from previously approved textbooks, for instructional
(not diagnostic) purposes is the "kind of direct aid to the educational function of the religious school [that] is indistinguishable
from the provision of a direct subsidy to the religious school that is
most clearly prohibited under the Establishment Clause."' 8 1 The
majority rejected the argument that the courses were "supplemental." The line between regular and supplemental courses is very
thin and could lead to public schools gradually taking over the entire secular curriculum of religious schools:
But there is no principled basis on which this Court can impose
a limit on the percentage of the religious school day that can be
subsidized by the public school. To let the genie out of the bottle in this case would be to permit ever larger segments of the
religious school curriculum to be turned over to the public
school system, thus violating the cardinal principle that the State
may not in effect
become the prime supporter of the religious
school system. 182
The companion case, Aguilar v. Felton,'8 3 involved a federally
funded program that posed less of a threat of "symbolic union" of
church and state or of government funding of major aspects of the
parochial school system. Unlike the Grand Rapids program, which
went beyond Meek in providing educational services through government employed personnel, the New York program in Aguilar was
limited to a narrow range of remedial programs funded by a federal
statute enacted in 1965 to assist lower income children in public
and private schools. This "aid-the-poor-child" approach was the
basis for the federal law, enacted during President Johnson's ad180 Id. at 3227, quoting Felton v. Secretary of United States Dept. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48,
67-68 (2d Cir. 1984).
181 105 S.Ct. at 3229.
182 Id. at 3230. The importance of keeping the "genie" in the bottle was emphasized by
Judge Friendly. See Felton v. Secretary of United States Dept. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 67 (2d
Cir. 1984). See also Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of
Grand Rapids, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983).
183 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985).
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ministration. 18 4 By providing assistance to lower income children
in both public and private schools, Title I, as it became known,
opened the prospect of federal funds to religious schools, an essential ingredient of the legislative compromise that overcame congressional objections to federal funding of public schools.
As in Grand Rapids, Justice Brennan's description of the New
York program is instructive:
Since 1966, the City of New York has provided instructional
services funded by Title I to parochial school students on the
premises of parochial schools. Of those students eligible to receive funds in 1981-1982, 13.2% were enrolled in private
schools. Of that group, 84% were enrolled in schools affiliated
with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and the diocese of Brooklyn and 8% were enrolled in Hebrew day schools.
With respect to the religious atmosphere of these schools, the
Court of Appeals concluded that "the picture that emerges is of
a system in which religious considerations play a key role in the
selection of students and teachers, and which has as its substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values."
The programs conducted at these schools include remedial
reading, reading skills, remedial mathematics, English as a second language, and guidance services. These programs are carried out by regular employees of the public schools (teachers,
guidance counselors, psychologists, psychiatrists and social
workers) who have volunteered to teach in the parochial
schools. The amount of time that each professional spends in
the parochial school is determined by the number of students in
the particular program and the needs of these students.
The City's Bureau of Nonpublic School Reimbursement
makes teacher assignments, and the instructors are supervised
by field personnel, who attempt to pay at least one unannounced visit per month. The field supervisors, in turn, report
to program coordinators, who also pay occasional unannounced
supervisory visits to monitor Title I classes in the parochial
schools. The professionals involved in the program are directed
to avoid involvement with religious activities that are conducted
within the private schools and to bar religious material in their
classrooms. All material and equipment used in the programs
funded under Title I are supplied by the Government and are
used only in those programs. The professional personnel are
solely responsible for the selection of the students. Additionally, the professionals are informed that contact with private
school personnel should be kept to a minimum. Finally, the administrators of the parochial schools are required to clear the
classrooms
used by the public school personnel of all religious
18 5
symbols.
184 Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 92 Stat. 2153, 20

U.S.C. § 2701 et. seq. (1982).
185 105 S.Ct. at 3235.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in striking down
the program, had described it as having "done so much good and
little, if any, harm."' 86 Its specific holding was based on the
Supreme Court's opinion in Meek v. Pittengerinvalidating, as an "entanglement," the use of public school personnel to teach remedial
courses in religious schools. Judge Friendly's opinion, however,
also discussed the significance of "the regular appearance of public
school teachers in religious schools,"' 8 7 the serious risks that the
religious school atmosphere would "penetrate into the remedial instruction,"'' 88 and the impossibility of imposing either financial or
subject-matter limitations if the Meek distinction were abandoned.' 8 9 In a significant footnote, Judge Friendly pointed to the
lower court opinion in the Grand Rapids case as an example of the
type of program that could be justified if the New York program
were upheld. 190 Thus, the Second Circuit opinion had paved the
way for an affirmance based on the "effect" prong.
Justice Brennan used many of Judge Friendly's arguments in
the Grand Rapids majority opinion, but relied exclusively on "entanglement" reasoning in affirming the Second Circuit's opinion in
Aguilar. New York, unlike Grand Rapids, had adopted a system for
monitoring the religious content of government funded classes. It
was this supervision, however, that was found by the majority to
create a danger of excessive entanglement between church and
state. As in Meek, the fact that the instruction was provided by
teachers (not books) on the premises of a pervasively sectarian
school would give rise to constant visits and inspections over the
continuous life of the program. The religious school would have to
"endure the ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary
purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard
against the infiltration of religious thought."' 19 These day-to-day
contacts are also likely to create "political divisiveness along religious lines .
Justice Brennan resurrected the spectre, originally propounded by the Chief Justice in Lemon, of "state
inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools and auditing
".'.."192

186 Felton v. Secretary of United States Dept. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 71-72 (2d Cir.
1984).
187 Id. at 67.
188 Id. at 66.
189 "We see no principal basis for limiting the position urged by appellees to remedial
instruction or clinical and guidance services." Id. at 66.
190 Id. at 67 n.21. The footnote, which cited the Sixth Circuit opinion in Grand Rapids,
was inserted after Judge Friendly wrote: "To relax Meeks' ban on sending public school
teachers and counselors into religious schoools ... would let the genie out of the bottle."
191 Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3239.
192 Id.
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classroom instruction .... "193
The two programs, and the two opinions of the Court, demonstrated anew the importance of the distinction developed by the
Court in the 1970's between programs conducted on and off the
premises of the religious schools. An extensive program such as
Grand Rapids' involves the government, as Justice Brennan argued,
in a joint educational venture, financially and administratively.
Although the overall impact of a narrower program, such as the one
in Aguilar, may have a less "symbolic" and fiscal effect of aiding religion, it still runs the risks of uniting church and state in the operation of the critical government function of education. The dangers
of government-sponsored teaching of religion, of a union of government and religion in the operation of the school system, of excessive day-to-day entanglement, and of government subsidy of a
major portion of the religious schools' curriculum, are far greater if
programs are conducted on religious school premises.
The "entanglement" prong always served the purpose of keeping these two systems apart. Grand Rapids could have been based
on entanglement alone, but the Court was right in recognizing that
when the state program actually moves close to the point of achieving the very evil that the prophylactic "entanglement" rule was
designed to prevent, then the "effect" is, as the Court said, one that
impermissibly advances the cause of religion. This was the approach of Justice Powell in Nyquist; it could have been used in
Lemon, although in the latter case the Court chose to speak only of
entanglement.
Just as Lemon recognized the difficulty of limiting a program of
state support of secular teachers in religious schools, Grand Rapids
and Aguilar recognized the similar problem in trying to contain a
program using public school teachers in religious schools to teach
"supplemental courses." Inevitably the public school teacher in the
parochial schoolhouse, no less than the public school dollar, will
lead to a massive direct subsidy and to the "symbolic union" of the
government and religious institutions.
It is possible that in some areas of the country, religious and
government authorities might try to work together to relieve religious schools of secular education, with the children of parochial
schools attending public schools for secular subjects-the reverse
of "released time." The validity of such programs may be one of
the issues lurking on the horizon. But religious schools may find
this alternative unattractive in view of the reason for creating religious schools-to place children in a pervasive religious atmosphere. Moreover, such a program would involve extensive
193 Id.
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cooperation of public schools with a variety of religious school systems with regard to scheduling, transportation, and teaching materials. Even if religious schools, in order to save money, are willing to
sacrifice a significant aspect of their educational mission by sending
children into public schools for a wide range of secular subjects, the
resulting entanglement, both political and administrative, and the
message of endorsement that such cooperation would involve,
might result in the same impermissible "effect" or "entanglement"
that proved fatal to the programs in Grand Rapids and New York.
While Justice Brennan's opinions in Grand Rapids and Aguilar
were major contributions to the development of establishment
clause law, only four other Justices (Marshall, Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens) agreed with them. Justice Powell, while concurring in
the majority opinion, filed a separate opinion stressing the "risk of
political divisiveness" as an "additional reason" for holding that
the two programs were invalid on entanglement grounds. Justice
Powell thus continues to adhere to his Nyquist opinion that proposals to extend direct financial aid to parochial schools will trigger
political strife between public school and religious school advocates, and between religious groups that sponsor religious schools
and those that do not. Justice Powell's opinion in these cases and
in Jaffree, suggest that Mueller v. Allen and Lynch v. Donnelly did not
represent a shift in position but rather were "close calls" on cases
that presented factual differences warranting, in his view, departures from earlier cases whose principles he still intends to
follow. 194
The Chief Justice dissented in Aguilar and in that portion of
Grand Rapids invalidating the Shared Time program. He found the
Community Education program invalid under the principles of
Lemon, chiefly because of the payments to instructors who were fulltime teachers in the religious schools. 195 He criticized the "obsession" with Lemon criteria and saw no threat to the values underlying
the establishment clause in either the New York or Grand Rapids
programs. 19 6
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinions in Grand Rapids and
Aguilar indicate that while her thoughtful efforts to clarify the law
may have stimulated the debate, her "clarification" of the Lemon
principles does not offer any clearer guide to the results of particular cases than did the original formulation. Perhaps this is why Justice O'Connor's Lynch v. Donnelly concurrence is so freely quoted by
194 Interestingly, Justice Powell, in hisJaffree opinion, stated that Lynch v. Donnelly ".
was based primarily on the long historical practice of including religious symbols in the
celebration of Christmas." 105 S. Ct. at 2494 n.5.
195 105 S. Ct. at 3231 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
196 Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3242 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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her colleagues tojustify opposite conclusions in the recent group of
cases. Justice Brennan, for example, argued that the "symbolic
union of church and state" in the Grand Rapids program conveyed
97
a message of endorsement of religion.
Justice O'Connor, in her Grand Rapids dissent, wrote simply
that she disagreed that the program impermissibly advances religion "for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Aguilar v.
Felton."' 998 But Justice O'Connor's Aguilar dissent examined only
the New York Title I program and concluded that it was not tainted
by any of the impermissible effects considered important by the majority in Grand Rapids. The majority opinion in Aguilar, however,
was not based on "effect" but on "entanglement." Thus, the Grand
Rapids majority opinion was not really answered in Justice
O'Connor's dissent. She did discuss the "entanglement" issue in
Aguilar and expressed disagreement with Meek and Wollman concerning the use of public school teachers on parochial school
premises.
In addition, Justice O'Connor objected, as she did in Lynch v.
Donnelly, to reliance on political divisiveness, but expanded her earlier objection to the "entanglement" prong by expressing "reservations" about the use of the entanglement test as an independent
ground for decision, even in an institutional setting. Justice Rehnquist concurred injustice O'Connor's opinions, while writing brief
dissents of his own in both cases, echoing some of the themes in his
Jaffree dissent.
The two cases that raised probably the most difficult questions
concerning whether the state was conveying a "message of endorsement for or disapproval of religion," to use Justice
O'Connor's phrase, were Lynch v. Donnelly and Grand Rapids v. Ball.
Justice O'Connor found no such "message" in the former case, because the creche was part of the Christmas celebration, and she did
not really discuss the issue in Grand Rapids, even though it was a
principal basis for the majority opinion. Justice Brennan's specific
arguments concerning the effect of the Grand Rapids program
should have been addressed by the dissenting Justice who, as the
newest member of the Court, has challenged her colleagues to approach these cases with new insights.
VI. Conclusion
The continued pressure to enlist government support for reli197 Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. at 3226. See also Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Wallace v.Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2490 n.42 (1985); see also ChiefJustice
Burger's dissent in the same case, id. at 2505, arguing that he saw no endorsement of religion in the silent prayer statute.
198 105 S.Ct. at 3216.
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gion guarantees a steady flow of establishment clause cases in the
years ahead, although the pace may not be quite so hectic as in the
past few years. On the horizon is the question of whether the
Widmar principle of "equal access" for religious clubs in public universities should be extended to public high schools, and whether
Congress' recent action bestowing such access was constitutional. 19 9 There will be more silent prayer cases, 20 0 challenges to
religious symbols in public places, 20 1 and to the creche standing
alone without Christmas decorations. If the past is prologue, Grand
Rapids and Aguilar will not resolve the issue of financial aid but will
instead trigger new forms of government funding for religious
schools. Laws such as that upheld in Mueller v. Allen may be enacted
at the state or national level, and sectarian schools may try to work
out extensive arrangements with public school authorities for children in such schools to spend a major portion of their school day
taking secular courses in public schools.
The view that the establishment clause should be interpreted
to emphasize the separation of church and state still commands a
majority of the Court. Five justices restated that view most forcefully in key cases during the past term, and a sixth, Justice
O'Connor, joined that group inJaffree. Her view of the policies behind the establishment clause may be less demanding in practice
than that of some of her colleagues, but Justice O'Connor is clearly
not abandoning the effort to define the proper role for government
and religion within the separationist model. Justice Rehnquist, on
the other hand, is prepared to abandon the Madison-Jefferson vision, and Justice White appears ready to join him. The Chief Justice has not accepted this position, although in several important
cases his concept of "mandated accommodation" may leave little
effective room for the principle of separation. Nevertheless, it
should not be forgotten that he wrote the majority opinion in
Lemon, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, and, recently, in Thornton v. Caldor.
He may have charted a path that veers from the views expressed by
Justice Black in Everson, and his own in Lemon, but he has not abandoned them.
When the Chief Justice assumed his present office in 1969, a
handful of decisions had attempted to define the broad contours of
establishment clause law. During the past sixteen years the Burger
Court has reshaped Jefferson's metaphorical wall. The Court has
responded to the intense pressures for government financial sup199 See note 81 supra.
200 See note 158 supra.
201 See McCreary v. Village of Scarsdale, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) (city could not
exclude creche from a public park when other free-standing displays were permitted), afd
by equally divided Court, Scarsdale v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
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port for religious schools, and to the growing political power of the
religious right, particularly during the Reagan years. While the
path has been irregular, and the results far from coherent, by the
end of the 1984-1985 Term a slender majority still appeared to
cling to the constitutional principles that were first articulated by
the Court nearly four decades ago. For those who believe that the
Court's overall interpretation of the establishment clause has
served well the interests of both government and religion, this is an
encouraging sign. But the close division on the Court, the results
in some recent cases, notably Lynch v. Donnelly, and the uncertain
vagaries of presidential politics remind us that the establishment
clause, like Jefferson's wall, is not made of stone.

